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INTRODUCTION
America faces a ticking demographic time bomb that requires
increased retirement savings.
Federal retirement policy today presents a regulatory paradox.2 Numerous
studies have shown that participants in retirement savings plans3 need
retirement planning education and investment advice. Yet they receive
materials that are either too basic for participants who are financially
sophisticated or too sophisticated for participants who are financially illiterate.
1 House Report accompanying The Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997, H.R. REP.
No. 105-104, at 6 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2768,2769.
2 See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 407 (1990). See
generally PHLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994); JAMES A. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY
(1989).
3 References throughout this Article to retirement plans refer to employee pension benefit plans subject
to all of the requirements of Title I of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002 (2)(A), 1003(a)-(b) (1994).
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Most participants do not receive professional investment advice before they
direct the investment of their retirements savings. Why? This situation is the
result of regulations and rulings issued by the Department of Labor, the federal
agency that interprets and enforces the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 4
This paradox is significant. Congress enacted ERISA to correct well-
publicized flaws in the traditional employer-controlled defined benefit plan.
5
Since the early 1980s, employers have moved away from the defined benefit
retirement plan and toward the 401(k) plan, under which each employee is
responsible for funding and directing the investment of his own retirement
savings (the "individual responsibility model"). 6  The pension industry
estimates that by the year 2001, 401(k) plan assets will grow to almost $1.5
trillion.7 The number of 401(k) plan participants will reach 28 million.' For
many individuals, the only source of retirement income to supplement Social
Security will be their 401(k) plan savings. 9 One of the most important tasks
faced by the Department of Labor today is to interpret and apply ERISA's
statutory provisions, originally designed to regulate the employer-controlled
defined benefit plan, to the employee-directed 401(k) plan.
The Department of Labor's current administrative policy toward 401(k)
plans today is flawed. It assumes a sophisticated level of financial and
investment knowledge that is beyond the competence of many 401(k) plan
participants.1l Recent Department of Labor initiatives designed to encourage
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.) ("ERISA"). ERISA is the federal law primarily
responsible, along with section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 401 (1994 & Supp. II 1997), for
the regulation of private employer-sponsored retirement plans. ERISA's original section numbers were
changed when it was codified in Title 29 of the United States Code, which contains the federal labor
provisions. The tax provisions of ERISA were codified as part of the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 of the
United States Code.
5 See infra note 17 and accompanying text. In a defined benefit plan, the plan promises to pay the
participant a fixed periodic payment upon commencement of retirement. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432 (1999). The employer is responsible for funding the plan and investing its assets. See infra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
6 See infra Part I.B. This trend has been well-publicized in the popular press. As the cover of the June
28, 1999 issue of U.S. News and World Report aptly describes, we have become a "401(k) Nation." U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., June 28, 1999, at cover.
7 See 401(k) Assets Climb, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., July 1996, at 60.
8 See id.
9 See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
10 See infra Part IV.A.
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retirement savings education for participants do not solve this problem.1
Instead, the Department of Labor has created additional uncertainty in an area
of ERISA that already was ambiguous. 2  These recent initiatives both
undermine ERISA's fiduciary protections for plan participants and impose an
undue burden on sponsoring employers-the opposite result of what Congress
intended when it enacted the statute. 3
This Article assumes that Congress is unwilling, or politically unable, to
modernize ERISA by making fundamental changes to the statute itself.14 I
argue that statutory amendments are not necessary. The Department of Labor
can and should "modernize" ERISA through its administrative authority to
interpret the statute. 15 I propose that the Department of Labor revisit and
amend its own administrative policies to reflect the reality of today's
individual responsibility model.16 Administrative modernization will solve the
regulatory paradox. The result will be a federal retirement policy that remains
true to ERISA's original goal-to ensure retirement income security for
millions of Americans.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL FOR
FEDERAL RETIREMENT POLICY
Congress developed ERISA's statutory scheme in the 1970s as a political
response to well-publicized fiduciary abuses, funding failures, and vesting
inequities common among defined benefit retirement plans in the 1950s and
1960s. 17 Beginning in the early 1980s, first social scientists and policy
makers, 18 and later legal scholars, 19 began to notice a trend. Participation in
" See infra Part Ill.B.
12 See infra Part IV.B.
13 See infra Parts IV.B & C.
14 See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
15 See generally WRILAM N. ESKIUDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
16 See infra Part V.
17 See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1-8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4639-46; S. REP. No.
93-127, at 1-11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838-47; AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW 1-7 (1991 & Supp. 1996); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 62-78 (2d ed. 1995); STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 179-226 (1997).
18 See, e.g., ROBERT L. CLARK & ANN A. MCDERMED, THE CHOICE OF PENSION PLANS IN A CHANGING
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (1990); EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., WHEN WORKERS CALL THE
SHOTS: CAN THEY ACHIEVE RETIREMENT SECURITY? (Dallas L. Salisbury ed., 1995); PENSION RESEARCH
COUNCIL, LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds.,
1998); POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997); THE
FUTURE OF PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 102-25 (Ray Schmitt ed., 1993); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
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traditional defined benefit retirement plans was declining.20  Participation in
individual account retirement plans (also known as defined contribution
retirement plans)21 was steadily increasing.22 Participation in 401(k) plans, a
type of individual account plan,23 was skyrocketing. Part I of this Article
explores the policy ramifications of these trends.
401(K) PENSION PLANS: MANY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE RETIREMENT
INCOME (1996); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: MOST EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER PRIVATE
PENSIONS USE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (1996); Ann C. Foster, Employee Participation in Savings and
Thrift Plans, 1993, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1996, at 17; Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, The
Stampede Toward DEFINED Contribution Plans: Fact or Fiction?, 31 INDUS. REL. 361 (1992); Richard A.
Ippolito, Toward Explaining the Growth of Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 34 INDUS. REL. 1 (1995);
Douglas L Kruse, Pension Substitution in the 1980s: Why the Shift Toward Defined Contribution?, 34 INDUS.
REL. 218 (1995); Leslie E. Papke, Participation In and Contributions To 401(k) Pension Plans: Evidence
From Plan Data, 30 J. HUM. RESOURCES 311 (1995).
19 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Essay: Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1519, 1547-50 (1997); Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments In Employer Securities: More Is Not
Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 80-81 & n.100 (1998); Deborah M. Weiss & Marc A. Sgaraglino,
Prudent RisksforAnxious Workers, 1996 WIs. L REV. 1175, 1180-83; John R. Keville, Note, Retire At Your
Own Risk. ERISA's Return on Investment?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 527-56 (1994).
2O See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 6 PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN, ABSTRACr OF 1993 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 80 tbl.F8 (1997); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 3-9.
21 In an individual account or defined contribution plan, the amount of the participant's retirement benefit
is the non-forfeitable amount available in the participant's plan account when benefit payments commence.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1994); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,439 (1999).
22 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 20, at 80 tbl.F8; see also GAO PRIVATE
PENSIONS REPORT, supra note 18, at 3-9.
23 Individual account plans come in various types. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST.,
FUNDAMErALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 69-79 (5th ed. 1997); see also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
supra note 17, at 71-241; DAN M. MCGILL Er AL, FuNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 247-96 (7th ed.
1996). The 401(k) plan, also known as the cash or deferred arrangement (CODA), is a particular type of
individual account plan. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1994 & Supp. 1111997); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-i (as amended in
1995); MCGILL ET AL., supra, at 285-86. The 401(k) plan is unique among the various types of individual
account plans in that contributions to the plan are funded by the employee-participants themselves, not the
employer. See I.R.C. § 401(k); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l. See generally EMLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INT.,
supra, at 93; AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 208-09.
24 See sources cited infra notes 27-36 and accompanying texL Various theories exist for why
participation in defined benefit plans has declined while participation in individual account plans has
increased. See, e.g., PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TRENDS IN PENSIONS
1992, at 59, 68 (1992); Steven Sass, Crisis In Pensions, REGIONAL REV. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston),
Spring 1993, at 14, reprinted in LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 17, at 53. One theory attributes the trend to
structural changes in the economy and corresponding shifts in the labor force. See, e.g., Gustman &
Steinmeier, supra note 18; Kruse, supra note 18. Another theory attributes the trend to the high costs of plan
administration and regulatory compliance for defined benefit plans relative to defined contribution plans. See
PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 20, at 2; CLARK & MCDERMED, supra note 18; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(k) Plans, supra note 18, at 13; McGILL Er AL., supra note 23, at 39-42; Edwin C.
Hustead, Trends In Retirement Income Plan Administrative Expenses, in LIVING WITH DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS, supra note 18, at 166, 166-77; Ippolito, supra note 18, at 13-18; Sylvester Schieber &
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A. The Rapid Growth of 401(k) Plans
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, the participant-directed 401(k)
plan did not exist. Today's 401(k) plan is the product of amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code, made pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1978,2 which
did not become became effective until 1980." Graph 1 below, taken from thePrivate Pension Plan Bulletin,27 illustrates the rapid growth of 401(k) plans.
GRAPH 1
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Gordon Goodfellow, Fat Cats, Bureaucrats, and Common Workers: Distributing the Pension Tax Preference
Pie, in PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION: IMPTCAnTONS FOR TOMORROW 17, 17-41 (Dallas L. Salisbury &
Nora Super Jones eds., 1994); Celia Silverman & Paul Yakoboski, Public and Private Pensions Today: An
Overview of the System, in PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION, supra, at 7, 107 n.15. Yet another theory is that
employers switched from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans because employees preferred the
investment control and portability of retirement benefits offered by individual account plans. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 13-14; Keville, supra note 19, at 542-43.
25 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 401(k)).
26 Id. § 135(c)(1). Congress enacted section 401(k) to resolve uncertainty concerning the qualified status
of certain profit sharing plans under section 401(a). See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1800, at 206-07 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7198, 7212-13. See generally Theodore E. Rhodes & Harry J. Conaway,
Cash or Deferred Arrangements, in 40 INST. ON FED. TAX'N, ERISA SuPP. § 6.02 (1982); Paul Schultz, Cash
or DeferredArrangements, in 43 INST. ON FED. TAX'N, CONFERENCE ON EMPLOYHE BENEFrrS § 10:01 (1985).
It is clear that Congress did not foresee the implications of section 401(k) when this section was added to the
Code. See R. Theodore Bena, Reflections on the Birth and Growth of 401(k) Plans, 22 TAX MGMT. COMP.
PLAN. J. 353, 358 (1994) (article by the generally recognized inventor of the 401(k) plan).
27 See Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., supra note 20, at 62 graph D. The Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration ("PWBA"), a division of the Department of Labor, compiles and publishes data
pertaining to retirement plans in the Private Pension Plan Bulletin.
2O00
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Table 1 below, compiled from the Private Pension Plan Bulletin data,
documents the growth of 401(k) plans from 1984 to 1993 using the measures
of number of active participants, number of plans, and plan assets.
TABLE 1
'"MEASURES" OF 401(k) PLANS
Number of Active Participants (in thousands)28
1984 7,540
1993 23,138
Number of 401(k) Plans29
1984 17,303
1993 154,527
401(k) Plan Assets (in millions) 30
1984 91,754
1993 616,316
By all these measures, the growth of 401(k) plans has been dramatic. 3 1 In a
separate 1996 study commissioned by Congress to ascertain the significance of
401(k) plans, the GAO reported that:
One in four workers who have pension coverage participates in a
401(k) pension plan .... Much of the growth in defined contribution
pension plans has been due to the increase in the number of 401(k)
28 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMiN., supra note 20, at 95 tbl.F.23. An "active participant" is
defined to include: (1) any worker currently in employment who is covered by a plan and who is earning
retained service credit under a plan, and (2) any nonvested former employee who has not yet incurred a break
in service. See id. at 19, n.l, tbl.B.7. I have focused on the category of "active" participants to illuminate
current and future trends.
29 See id. at 95 tbl.F23.
30 See id.
31 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMIN., STUDY OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES, April 13,
1998, available at <http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba>; Profit Sharing Council Finds Increase In Company
Sponsorship of 401(K) Plans, 187 DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 28, 1998, at G-1 (stating that 401(k) plan
sponsorship has nearly doubled among companies with more than 100 employees from 1994 to 1998).
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pension plans. In 1992, 401(k) plans accounted for 20 percent of all
pension plans and 35 percent of all pension plan participants.
32
401(k) plans are particularly popular among smaller employers.
33
Significantly, smaller employers oftentimes offer 401(k) plans as the only
retirement plan for their employees. 34 Moreover, the rapid growth of 401(k)
plans is expected to continue in the future. Pension industry estimates
hypothesize that by the year 2001, the number of 401(k) plan participants will
reach 28 million35 and 401(k) plan assets will increase to almost $1.5 trillion.
36
These industry projections, published in 1996, are likely understated given
subsequent changes in the law that make 401(k) plans more widely available.
At the time these projections were published, tax-exempt organizations could
not establish new 401(k) plans for their employees. 3T Congress has since
amended the law to allow tax exempt employers to establish new 401(k) plans
for their employees. 38  In addition, Congress has simplified the rules for
administering 401(k) plans to encourage small employers (those with 100 or
fewer employees) to adopt 401(k) plans for their employees. 39 These changes
in the law are likely to increase participation in 401(k) plans; only the potential
magnitude of the increase is unknown.
B. Implications for Federal Retirement Policy
The employer-controlled defined benefit plar and the participant-directed
401(k) plan represent two distinct policy models for retirement. The defined
benefit plan is a "paternalistic" model4° in that the employer, rather than the
employee, bears the responsibility for ensuring that the plan's promised level
32 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PLANS, supra note 18, at 2-3.
33 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFrFS ADMIN., supra note 20, at 49 tbl.D.4 (showing number of 401(k)
type plans by participants size and primary or supplemental status, 1993). The Private Pension Plan Bulletin
data for 1993 indicate that of the 154,527 401(k) plans reported, 129,156 had 99 or fewer participants. See id.
34 See id, Of the 154,527 401(k) plans reported for 1993, 131,988 were the only plan sponsored by the
employer. Of this number, 115,845 plans had 99 or fewer participants. See id,
5 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
36 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
37 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1116(b)(3), 100 Stat. 2085,2455 (adding I.R.C. §
401(k)(4)(B)).
38 See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1426(a), 110 Stat. 1801; H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 239-40 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,1731-32; Stanley D. Baum,
IRA Planning After the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997-More Choices Than Ever, 87 J. TAX'N 204 (1997).
39 See Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1421-22, 110 Stat. 1755; H.R. CON.
REPT. No. 104-737, supra note 38, at 235-39, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1727-31.
40 See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory,
58 U. Cmi. L REV. 1275, 1276-77 (1991).
2000]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
of retirement benefits is provided to the retired participant. 41 In contrast, the
participant-directed 401(k) plan shifts the risks and responsibilities for
retirement income security to the individual.
In the traditional defined benefit plan, the plan promises to pay the
participant a specified level of benefits upon retirement in accordance with the
formula described in the plan.42  The employer sponsoring the plan is solely
responsible and legally liable for funding the benefits promised by the plan.
This funding obligation is independent of the profitability or financial status of
the employer.44 The plan's assets are held in one trust fund; there is no
separate account for each plan participant.45 The employer (or the employer's
designated fiduciary)46 is solely responsible for investing the plan's assets.47
The employer bears the market risk with respect to the plan's investments. If
the plan's investments perform well, investment gains may offset the amount
the employer must contribute to the plan. If the plan suffers investment losses,
however, the employer must make up for those losses through additional
contributions. In the event the plan cannot pay the participant's promised
retirement benefits, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)48
insurance program will pay at least some portion of the promised retirement
benefits to the participants.
41 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999). An introductory overview of the
characteristics of defined benefit plans is contained in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra note 23, at
55-80. For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of defined benefit plans, see AMERICAN BAR
AsS'N, supra note 17, at 358-440; MCGi.L ET AL., supra note 23, at 201-24.
42 See sources cited supra note 41. The normal form of payment of this retirement benefit will be an
annuity for the life of the participant or, if the participant is married, an annuity for the joint lives of the
participant and spouse. The defined benefit plan may offer the participant (and, if married, the participant's
spouse) the choice of a different form of payment, such as a lump sum payment. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (1994
& Supp. 111 1997); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 161-68; McGILL ET AL., supra note 23, at 220-24.
43 For a discussion of the minimum funding requirements for defined benefit plans, see AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, supra note 17, at 135-143; McGILL ET AL., supra note 23, at 595-604.
44 Waivers of the minimum funding requirements are obtainable under certain conditions for employers
in financial distress. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 137-39; MCGILL ET AL., supra note 23, at
603.
41 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1002(35) (1994).
46 ERISA permits the sponsoring employer to appoint a fiduciary investment manager for the plan's
assets. See id. § 1103(a).
47 Seeid. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
48 The PBGC is a self-financed public corporation similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. For a discussion of the PBGC and its defined benefit plan
insurance program for single-employer plans, see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 362-89; MCGiLL ET
AL., supra note 23, at 743-56.
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In the participant-directed 401(k) plan, each individual is responsible for
determining the amount of his own retirement benefit.49 The individual must
decide how much of his compensation to contribute to his retirement account
in the 401(k) plan.50 This decision ideally would require the participant to
have a retirement income goal in mind. The participant also must decide how
to invest the funds contributed to his 401(k) retirement account. 1  This
investment decision is important to achieving the participant's retirement
income goal because accumulated investment earnings over time will form a
significant portion of the participant's retirement savings. 2 These contribution
and investment decisions are critical ones because the participant's retirement
benefit will amount to the balance in his 401(k) plan account.5
The participant-directed 401(k) plan presents a challenge to policy makers.
At the individual level, the "success" of each participant plan in achieving
49 The participant's salary deferral contributions to the 401(k) plan could, of course, be supplemented by
the employer through a matching or profit sharing contribution. For purposes of illustration and discussion, I
have omitted these possibilities.
50 Each employee who participates in the plan elects to reduce his or her current compensation by up to
the lesser of the section 402(k)(11) amount ($6,000 in 1999) or 15% of the employee's compensation. See
I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997); LR.S. Notice 98-53, 1998-46 I.R.B. 24; EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
RESEARCH INsT., supra note 23, at 100. This amount is then contributed by the employer to the employee's
individual account under the 401(k) plan. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. MI 1997). Highly
compensated employees may not be able to defer the maximum amount due to the section 401(k)
nondiscrimination rules. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra note 23, at 96-97.
Until very recently, the conventional approach to 401(k) plan design held that a participant had to
decide affirmatively to contribute to a 401(k) plan. Inaction by the employee meant no contributions were
made. In a 1998 private letter ruling, however, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that employers could enroll
their employees in the employer's 401(k) plan and deduct a portion of each employee's compensation, thus
shifting the burden to the employee to "opt out" of participation in the plan. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-400-48 (Jul. 7,
1998); see also infra note 219.
51 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994 & Supp. 111997) (discussed infra Part H.C.). According to 1995 data
collected and published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, among medium and large employers who sponsor
401(k) plans, 83% permit the employee to choose how his salary deferral contributions will be invested. See
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE
ESTABUSHMENTS, 1995, at 139 tbl. 165 (1998).
52 For an illustration of the effect of tax-deferred accumulated earnings, see LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra
note 17, at 156.
53 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra note 23, at 70. This retirement benefit is likely to be
paid in the form of a lump sum. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 142 thl. 170 (showing
that 92% of 401(k) plans permit lump sum distribution payments). Many 401(k) plans also permit the
participant to access his 401(k) plan retirement benefits prior to retirement in the form of plan loans or
hardship withdrawals. See id. at 141-42 tbls. 168 & 169; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION
LOANS: LOAN PROvISIONS ENHANCE PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECt INCOME SECURITY FOR SOME (1997).
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retirement security54 is highly dependent on the contribution and investment
decisions made by that individual. These decisions require a certain level of
information and knowledge, along with the ability to apply that knowledge to
one's own financial circumstances. The aggregate successes and failures of
participants in 401(k) plans have direct and significant political and policy
implications on a nationwide scale. Numerous prophets have foretold of the
coming demographic sea change as the baby boomers approach retirement
age.55 Many studies have examined the traditional "three-legged stool" of
federal retirement policy56 and conclude that two of the three financial "legs"
that are to support future retirees-personal savings and Social Securit-are
failing. Personal savings rates are at their lowest levels since 1939.' The
54 "Success" in achieving retirement security is in itself an amorphous concept with many possible
measures. See, e.g., Emily S. Andrews, Gaps In Retirement Income Adequacy, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS,
supra note 18, at 1.
55 See Retirement Income Security: Can the Baby Boom Generation Afford to Retire, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security of the House of Representatives Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 43-52
(1993) (testimony of Paul Yakoboski); B. Douglas Bernheim, Adequacy of Savings for Retirement and the
Role of Economic Literacy, in RETIREMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 73 (Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones
eds., 1994); Richard A. Easterlin et al., How Have American Baby Boomers Fared? Earnings and Economic
Well-Being of Young Adults, 1964-1987, 3 J. POPULATION ECON. 277 (1990); Laurence Kotlikoff & Alan J.
Auerbach, U.S. Fiscal and Savings Crises and Their Impact for Baby Boomers, in RETIREMENT IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra, at 109; Joyce Manchester, Baby Boomers in Retirement: An Early Perspective, In
RETIREMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra, at 63; Samuel H. Preston, Demographic Change in the United
States, 1970-2050, in DEMOGRAPHY AND RETIREMENT: THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 19 (Anna M. Rappaport
& Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1993); Paul Yakoboski & Celia Silverman, Baby Boomers in Retirement: What
Are Their Prospects? in RETIREMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra, at 13; EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH
INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 151, BABY BOOMERS INRETIREMENT: WHAT ARE THIR PROSPECTS? (1994).
56 See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECON. COMM., 90TH CONG., OLD AGE INCOME
ASSURANCE: A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON PROBLEMS AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PENSION SYSTEM 45 (Comm. Print 1967) (dating the origins of the three-legged stool analogy to the period
following the rapid expansion of private pension plans during and following World War 1); PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 12 (Final
Report 198 1); Bob Davis, Clinton Policy Reveals Deep-Seated Reliance on Small Furniture, WALL ST. J., Feb.
22, 1999, at Al.
57 See Keville, supra note 19, at 545; Associated Press, Americans' Savings Lowest Ever; Rate is
Contrary to Economy's Growth, NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 1998, at A35; Christina Duff, Consumer Outlays Exceed
Income, Driving Savings to a Record Low Level, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1998, at A2; see also U.S. Private
Savings Crisis-Long Term Economic Implications and Optionsfor Reform, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Deficits, Debt Management, and Long-Term Economic Growth of the Senate Comm on Finance, 103d Cong.
2 (1994); Kotlikoff & Auerbach, supra note 55, at 94-95; JCT StaffDescription of Tax Incentives for Savings,
29 DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 12, 1998, at L-27, L-33 ("The personal savings rate of 3.8 percent of disposable
personal income is the lowest computed by the Commerce Department since 1939."). Although some may
contend that households are merely substituting retirement plan savings for personal savings, at least one study
indicates that this is not the case, particularly for lower income households. See J. Sabelhaus, How Does
Pension Coverage Affect Household Savings?, in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PENSIONS, SAVINGS, AND CAPITAL
MARKERS 47, 55-57 (1996). But see Gordon, supra note 19, at 1548.
[Vol. 49
CONFORMING ERISA POLICY TO REALITY
projected fiscal "collapse" of the Social Security system,58 unless significant
but controversial changes are made,59 is now a given in the minds of both
politicians6  and the public.61  Thus, the need for a strong "third leg" of
employer-sponsored retirement plans is greater than ever.
In the world of the individual responsibility model, retirement income
security will be determined by the decisions of the plan participants
themselves. It is crucial to know whether participants are making retirement
planning decisions that are likely to result in the accumulation of adequate
retirement income. Subpart C examines the empirical evidence and research
concerning participant decision-making under the individual responsibility
model.
58 See THE 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABLIY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No. 105-72, at 28-29 (1997);
see also Kotlikoff & Auerbach, supra note 55, at 90-91; Sylvester J. Schieber, Can Our Social Insurance
Systems Survive the Demographic Shifts of the Twenty-First Century?, in DEMOGRAPHY AND RETIREMENT,
supra note 55, at 111.
59 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 58, at 29-30; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL
SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY (1998); C. EUGENE STEUERLE &
JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 157 (1994); Edward M. Gramlich,
Reforming Social Security?, in POSITIONING PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 220; Kotlikoff & Auerbach, supra
note 55, at 89-91; Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldes, Social Security Privatization: A Structure for
Analysis, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 363-67 (1996); Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security:
Misguided Reform, 71 TEMP. L REV. 131, 131-69 (1998); John E. Porter, Individual Social Security
Retirement Accounts, in POSITIONING PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 230; Retirement Planning: Employers Not
Planning to Increase Benefits to Cover Any Social Security Cuts, Pens. & Bens. Daily (BNA), at d7 (Aug. 17,
1998); Steve Stecklow & Sara Calian, Social Security Switch in U.K is Disastrous; A Caution to the U.S.?,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at Al; Trustees, Others Urge Congress to Act Soon, Despite OASI Remaining
Solvent Until 2029, Pens. & Bens. Daily (BNA), at d2 (May 5, 1997).
60 See, e.g., Colleen T. Congel, Bipartisan Legislation to Include Personal Accounts, Higher Retirement
Age, 36 DAILY TAX REP., July 16, 1998, at G-5, G-6; Sen. Roth to Introduce Bill Today Dedicating Half of
Surplus to Personal Security Accounts, 145 DAILY TAX REP., July 29, 1998, at G-1.
61 Surveys of public opinion indicate that public confidence in the Social Security program is low,
particularly among younger workers. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTJTHE GALLUP ORG., INC.,
PUBLIC ATmUDES ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 1995, at 16, Question 5 (EBRI Report No. 6-62, Mar. 1995);
EMPLOYEE BENEFIrS RESEARCH INSTJrHE GALLUP ORG., INC., PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON RETIREMENT INCOME,
1994, at 15, Question 5 (EBRI Report No. G-55, 1994).
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C. Evidence of Participant Decision-Making Under the Individual
Responsibility Model
Sex education and 401(k) education have a lot in common: No one
can agree on how much students should be told.
62
A number of studies have attempted to examine the retirement savings
knowledge and decision-making behavior of plan participants. The results of
these studies consistently indicate that, although some plan participants are
highly knowledgeable and make retirement savings decisions that are likely to
lead to the accumulation of adequate retirement savings, many participants
suffer from financial "illiteracy." As a result, they make decisions that place
them at risk of failing to accumulate adequate savings for retirement.
1. Participant Retirement Savings and Financial Knowledge
Many Americans have a false sense of confidence as it concerns their own
retirement. A 1993 study (the "Bernheim Study") found that among the least
financially secure segment of the population, nearly two-thirds believed that
their standard of living during retirement would be as high or higher than it
was today, despite the fact that most of these individuals acknowledged that
they saved significantly less than they should, and expressed little or no
confidence in Social Security.63  The 1997 Retirement Confidence Survey
("RCS") 64 found that although only six percent of Americans "believe that, in
general, people in the United States save enough money to live comfortably
throughout their retirement years," sixty-eight percent were "very confident" or
62 Ellen E. Schultz, Employees Looking forAdvice on 401(k)s Often Face Obstacles, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6,
1998, at Cl.
63 This study was conducted by B. Douglas Bernheim, the Lewis and Virginia Eaton Professor of
Economics at Stanford University. The study was conducted through an analysis of annual household survey
data collected by Merrill Lynch, Inc. in 1993. See B. Douglas Bemheim, Financial Illiteracy, Education, and
Retirement Saving, in LIVING WrrH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 38.
64 The 1997 Retirement Confidence Survey, the seventh in a series of annual surveys, was co-organized
by the Employee Benefits Research Institute ("EBRr'), the American Savings Education Council ("ASEC"),
and Mathew Greenwald & Associates, Inc. EBRI is a private, nonprofit and nonpartisan public policy research
organization. ASEC, which is part of the EBRI Education and Research Fund, is a nonpartisan partnership of
more than 200 private and public sector institutions whose mission is to raise public awareness of what is
needed to ensure long-term financial security in retirement. Mathew Greenwald & Associates, Inc. is a market
research firm based in Washington, D.C.
The 1997 RCS was conducted in July 1997 through telephone interviews with 1,001 randomly selected
individuals ages 25 and older. Of these 1,001 individuals surveyed, 772 were current workers and 229 were
retirees. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., THE 1997 RETIREMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY (RCS)
SIrMMARYOFF NDINGS 1 (1997).
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"somewhat confident" that they personally would have enough money to live
comfortably throughout their retirement years.65 Among those who identified
themselves as "very confident" concerning their personal retirement prospects,
only slightly more than half had actually attempted to calculate their retirement
savings needs.66  The 1997 RCS found that overall only 36% of current
workers had attempted to determine the amount they needed for retirement.67
Out of the 36% who had attempted a calculation, however, 24% could not give
a figure when asked. Thus, the RCS concluded that in reality approximately
75% of all current workers have no idea of the amount they need to save for
retirement.69 This survey result is ominous because a target or goal for
retirement savings is a prerequisite for informed decision-making by partici-
pants in 401(k) plans.
Studies also have concluded that a significant portion of the public lacks
fundamental knowledge of the financial concepts necessary for decision-
making under the individual responsibility model. The Bernheim Study
reported that "existing literature demonstrates that most Americans know little
about managing personal finances and their choices reflect this ignorance."
70
The Bernheim Study also reported that many study respondents do not
understand common financial instruments, noting that "[r]oughly 42 percent
could not identify the proper explanation for the difference in average returns
between mutual funds and federally insured CDs.''71 An analysis of the results
of the 1996 RCS reached a similar conclusion, finding that "the majority of
working Americans appear to have a limited amount of financial knowledge
regarding issues important in planning and saving for retirement.,72
The 1996 RCS assessed the public's general knowledge regarding
retirement planning and savings issues. Based on the answers to the survey
questions, 33% of workers were judged to have a high level of retirement
financial knowledge, 55% of workers were judged to have only a moderate
65 lId at 3.
6' Id. at 4.
67 Id. at 3. The 1998 Retirement Confidence Survey found that this 36% figure had increased to 45%.
See EMPLOYEE BENEFTS RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 200, WHAT Is YOUR SAVINGS PERSONAIrTY?
THE 1998 RmMENT CONFIDENCE SURVEY 3 (1998).
68 See EMPLOYEE BENEFrIS RESEARCH INST., supra note 64, at 4.
69 See id.
70 Bernheim, supra note 63, at 43.
71 Id. at44.
72 EMPLOYEE BENEFIrS RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF No. 181, THE REALITY OF RETIREMENT TODAY:
LESSONS IN PLANNING FOR TOMORROW 9 (1997).
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level of retirement financial knowledge, and 11% had little relevant knowledge
of financial issues. 73 Not surprisingly, on average the higher the workers'
educational level and household income, the greater level of retirement
financial knowledge they possessed.74
Given the emphasis placed by the individual responsibility model on
participants' direction and control over the investment of their retirement plan
assets, it is particularly important for plan participants to be informed of the
relative historical returns among basic investment options offered in
participant-directed plans. The results of the 1996 RCS indicate that many
individuals do not have a working knowledge of the historical returns for
common categories of investment options. For example, only 61% of workers
knew that over the last twenty years, the U.S. stock market provided a greater
rate of return than U.S. government bonds.75 Only 53% of workers knew that
employer stock is typically a more volatile investment than a diversified
portfolio of stocks.76
In addition to lacking a retirement savings goal and basic investment
knowledge, many workers appear to underestimate the amount of time they
will spend in retirement.77 When asked about the life expectancy of a male
who retires at age sixty-five, less than half knew that the average life
expectancy was 80 years.78 Significantly, a majority either underestimated the
average life expectancy or did not know the average life expectancy.
79
In summary, research studies indicate that there is a lack of knowledge
among the public concerning retirement savings goals, basic investment in-
formation, and a realistic assessment of the amount of time likely to be spent in
retirement. This lack of knowledge would not be a cause for concern if plan
participants sought advice from financial and retirement professionals. In
reality, however, the Bemheim Study found that individuals rarely seek
professional guidance. Instead, most people rely primarily on their own
judgment or the advice of parents, relatives, and friends.80
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 9-10.
76 See id. at 10.
77 Retirement Planning: Retirement Education Said Critical to Financial Security of Employees, Pens. &
Bens. Daily (BNA), at d7 (May 13, 1998).
78 See EMPLOYEE BENEITS RESEARCH INST., IssuE BRIEF No. 169, PARTICIPANT EDUCATION: ACTIONS
AND OUrCOMES 6 (1996).
79 See id.
80 See Bernheim, supra note 63, at 55-56. The 1998 RCS found that even among the 17% of the
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The lack of knowledge among plan participants, coupled with their re-
luctance to seek professional advice, is problematic because such knowledge
forms the foundation for decision-making under the individual responsibility
model. Workers who do not calculate the amount they need for retirement,
who invest poorly, and who underestimate the amount of time they will spend
in retirement, are unlikely to attain their desired standard of living during
retirement. The research evidence presented below indicates that many plan
participants are likely to become disappointed retirees.
2. Decisions Concerning Plan Participation and Contribution Amounts
On an aggregate level, the 1997 RCS found that 76% of employees who
were offered a 401(k) or similar plan by their employer chose to participate in
the plan by making contributions. Among these plan participants, only 65%
were aware of the maximum amount that could be contributed, and less than
50% of these plan participants actually contributed the maximum amount.
82
The three top reasons given by participants choosing not to contribute to the
plan were: (1) cannot afford to save; (2) saving for other goals; and (3)
difficulty in withdrawing funds. 3
A 1993 study found that the average contribution rate was 7% of annual
wages.84 Not surprisingly, higher income workers tend to contribute more to
their 401(k) plan than lower income workers, and older workers contribute
more than younger workers.85 A 1996 study found, for example, that on
average, workers earning $75,000 or more contribute over 8% of salary, while
workers earning less than $25,000 contribute less than 5% of salary. 86
population characterized as "retirement savers," the most common source of information for making
investment decisions was input from a spouse (80%). See EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 200, supra note 67, at 3, 10;
Arleen Jacobius, Looking to Plan Sponsors: One-Third of Participants Get Most 401(k) Investment
Informationfrom Newsletters and Education Programs, PENSIONS & INVEsTMENTS, Nov. 30, 1998 at 14.
81 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra note 64, at 6. Similar retirement savings plans would
be a 403(b) plan, a salary reduction simplified employee pension plan, or a plan for state and local government
employees established under Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 457 (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
See EBRI IssuE BRIEF No. 181, supra note 72, at 8.
82 See EMPLOYEE BENEGrrs RESEARCH INST., supra note 64, at 8.
83 See id.
84 EMPLOYEE BENEFrrS RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 174, CONTRIUTON RATES AND PLAN
FEATURES: AN ANALYSIS OFLARGE401(K) PLAN DATA 3 (1996).
85 See Robert L. Clark & Sylvester J. Schieber, Factors Affecting Participation Rates and Contribution
Levels in 401(k) Plans, in LIVING WrrH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, supra note 18, at 69, 71-74; U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFiCE, 401(K) PLANS, supra note 18, at 6.
86 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFCE, 401(K) PLANS, supra note 18, at 6.
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Researchers have attempted to identify the factors that influence an em-
ployee's decision whether to participate in and how much to contribute to'a
401(k) plan.87 Numerous studies have concluded that a major factor
influencing employee participation and contribution rates is participant
retirement savings education provided by the employer.88  For example, the
1998 RCS found that among workers who received educational materials or
attended seminars about retirement savings through their employer, 41% were
influenced by this educational information to begin participating in a
retirement savings plan, and 43% were influenced to change the amount they
contributed to their retirement savings plan.89 Other studies similarly conclude
that retirement savings education and materials provided by the employer
increase participation rates and contribution amounts.
90
3. Decisions Concerning Investment Allocation of Retirement Plan Assets
When employees call the shots, they invariably shoot themselves in
the foot. If we've heard it once, we've heard it a thousand times.
Employees don't know how to invest. They invariably buy in at the
top of the market and sell at the bottom. You could probably make
money watching what they do and doing just the opposite.91
Like the decisions of whether to participate in a 401(k) plan and how much
to contribute, the participant's investment decisions play a crucial role in
87 See, e.g., EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 181, supra note 72, at 8; EBRI ISsUE BRIEFNO. 174, supra note 84,
at 4; EBRI IssuE BRIEF No. 169, supra note 78, at 7-8; Bernheim, supra note 63, at 56-64; Clark & Schieber,
supra note 85, at 71-81; Andrea L. Kusko et al., Employee Decisions with Respect to 401(k) Plans, in LIVING
WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, supra note 18, at 98; Papke, supra note 18, at 313-24.
88 See EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 200, supra note 67, at 12-13; EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 169, supra note 78, at
7-8, 18-19; EMPLOYEE BENEFrrS RESEARCH INST., supra note 64, at 6; Bernheim, supra note 63, at 56-64;
Clark & Schieber, supra note 85, at 82-95; see also Employers Will Not Increase Benefits to Cover Social
Security Costs, Survey Finds, DAILY TAX REP., Aug. 8, 1998, at G-2, G-3. The other major factors that
influence participants are the availability of an employer matching contribution, the constraints on the
maximum employee contribution amount, and the availability of plan loans. See EBRI ISSUE BRIEF NO. 181,
supra note 72, at 8-9; EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 174, supra note 84, at 11-13; GAO 401(K) LOANS REPORT,
supra note 53, at 5-6; Clark & Schieber, supra, at 82-95; Kusko et al., supra note 87, at 104-06; Papke, supra
note 18, at 318-24.
89 See EBRI IsSUEBRIEFNO. 200, supra note 67, at 12-13.
90 See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BEN=S REsEARCH INsT., supra note 64, at 6; EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 169, supra
note 78, at 7; Bemheim, supra note 63, at 56-64; Clark & Schieber, supra note 85, at 82-95; Paul Yakoboski,
Participant-Directed Retirement Plans Today and Critical Issues for Tomorrow, in WHEN WORKERS CALL
THE SHOTS, supra note 18, at 9.
91 Dave Veeneman &Elizabeth McWhirter, Implementing Effective AssetAllocation, in WHEN WORKERS
CALL THE SHOTS, supra note 18, at 51, 5 1.
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determining his retirement income. Inappropriate investment allocations place
the participant at risk of accumulating insufficient retirement assets.
92
Surveys of plan participants indicate that, although a majority of
participants who make contributions to retirement plans prefer to make their
own investment decisions, a substantial minority do not. A 1994 survey found
that 62% of survey respondents who contributed to a plan wanted to make their
own investment decisions, but 34% would prefer to have their employer make
their investment decisions for them.93 Another 1994 study obtained similar
results-33% of participants wanted someone else to manage their retirement
savings for them. Significantly, this same study found that only 26% of plan
participants, and only 8% of plan sponsors, believed the participants were well-
qualified to make their own investment decisions. 95
When examining the investment allocation behavior of participants under
the individual responsibility model, aggregate or average figures can be
misleading from a policy perspective because they mask key distinctions
among individual participants. 9 Several case studies using individual level
data, each of which is described below, indicate that a significant number of
participants make investment decisions that are contrary to the basic principles
of prudent retirement investing.
a. EBRI case study
The Employee Benefits Research Institute ("EBRI') 97 conducted a case
study of participant investment allocation decisions for participants in 401(k)
plans sponsored by three very large employers: AT&T, IBM Corporation, and
New York Life Insurance Company.98 Each 401(k) plan had an average of
92 See Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 19, at 1182 n.10; Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., On Your Own:
Companies Are Giving Employees Investment Control of Their Retirement Money: That Can Be Good-or
Bad, vAuL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1994, at R19; Pui-Wing Tam, Market Timers Refuse to Heed Warnings on
Retirement Money, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at C1. The ability of participants to make investment
decisions has obvious broader implications for current proposals to reform Social Security. See supra note 59.
93 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTJHE GALLUP ORG., INC., PUauC ATnTUDES ON
INVESTMENT PREFERENCEs, EBRI Report No. G-61 (1994).
94 See Yakobosld, supra note 90, at 20.
95 See id.
96 See Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber, Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement
Plans, in POSITIONING PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 67, 74-76; EMPLOYEE BENEFrrS RESEARCH INST., ISsuE
BRIEF NO. 176, WORKER INvTMENT DECISIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF LARGE 401(K) PLAN DATA 13-14 (1996).
97 EBRI is a private, nonprofit and nonpartisan public policy research organization that conducts research
on employee benefit programs in the private sector, including retirement plans. See supra note 64.
98 See EBRI IssuEB iEFNo. 176, supra note 96, at 3.
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60,000 participants. 99 Two of the plans offered employer securities as an
investment option.1°° All three 401(k) plans had well-developed educational
programs to assist workers in making appropriate investment decisions.
101
The EBRI case study found that the percentage of plan participants who
had none of their 401(k) plan assets invested in equity funds (excluding
company stock) was 21%, 25% and 37%, respectively, for the three plans.10
One of the basic principles of retirement investing is that younger workers
should invest more heavily in a diversified portfolio of equities because
although they have greater short term volatility, over the long run equities have
a higher rate of investment return. 103 Surprisingly, the EBRI case study found
that, despite the investment education programs offered by the employer, the
percent of younger participants (aged twenty to twenty-nine and thirty to
thirty-nine) with zero equity investments ranged from 17% to 34%. 1°4 The
EBRI study concluded that a large percentage of participants, particularly
younger plan participants, were potentially at risk of accumulating insufficient
retirement assets.
105
With respect to non-equity investments, the EBRI study found that the
average percentage of participants who had over 80% of their 401(k) plan
account balance invested in non-equities was 29%, 32%, and 11%. 1°6 When
analyzed by age group, the study found that for each plan this percentage
increased with participant age.107 This behavior is encouraging because it is
consistent with the basic retirement investing principle that as individuals ap-
proach retirement age they should adjust their portfolio to a more conservative
(i.e., less volatile) mix of holdings.10 8
The study contained mixed results for the two plans that offered company
stock as an investment option. Generally, retirement planning professionals do
not recommend high concentrations of investment in company stock because
such investments magnify the risk that the participant will suffer both reduced
lifetime and retirement income if the employer becomes financially in-
99 See id. at 4.
100 See id.
101 See id.
'02 Id. at 7, 10, 12.
103 See id. at 7.
'04 Id. at 13-14 & chart 1.
'05 Id at 7, 10, 13-14.
'06 Id. at 8, 10, 13 tbl.8.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 8, 9, 14.
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secure1 °9  In one plan, the average account balance was 42% invested in
company stock.'10 For this plan, approximately 20% of participants had
nothing invested in company stock, and approximately 20% had over 80%
invested in company stock."1  In contrast, the average account balance
investment in company stock for the other plan was only 6%, with over 77% of
participants having nothing invested in company stock and only approximately
2% of participants being over 80% invested in company stock.' The EBRI
study concluded that one of the primary reasons for the smaller percentage of
participants of the first plan who were highly concentrated (over 80% invested)
in non-equities was the plan's much larger concentration of investments in
company stock."
3
b. Goodfellow and Schieber case study
Goodfellow and Schieber conducted a case study using administrative
records on slightly more than 36,000 participants drawn from 24 defined
contribution plans holding nearly $1.4 billion in assets.114 The results of the
Goodfellow and Schieber case study were consistent with those of the EBRI
case study. The Goodfellow and Schieber study found that, in accordance with
conventional retirement planning wisdom, as participants aged they tended to
move away from the riskier (equity) investment options." 5  The Goodfellow
and Schieber study also found, however, that there were significant numbers of
plan participants who were highly concentrated in either non-equity invest-
ments or company stock.1 6 Significantly, the study found that workers at the
lowest wage levels were three to five times as likely to have 80% or more of
their plan assets invested in company stock than workers at higher wage
'0' See Vickie L. Bajtelsmit & Jack L. VanDerhei, Risk Aversion and Pension Investment Choices, in
POSITIONING PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 45, 55; Goodfellow & Schieber, supra note 96, at 80; Stabile, supra
note 19, at 81-82. A 1997 GAO report using 1993 data on the extent of 401(k) plan investment in employer
stock found that although less than 2% of 401(k) plans were invested in employer stock, such investments
constituted over 10% of 401(k) plan assets and affected over 25% of 401(k) plan participants. This result
occurs because it is the largest employer plans that tend to offer employer stock as an investment option. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTINo OFFIcE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: EXTENT OF PLANS' INVESTMENTS IN EMPLOYER
SECURITIES AND REAL PROPERTY (1997).
110 See EBRI ISSUEBRIEFNO. 176, supra note 96, at 11.1"' See id.at l3 &tl.8.
112 See id. at S & thl.3.
113 See id. at 15. Professor Stabile reports other studies finding similarly high concentrations of
investments in employer stock in 401(k) plans. Stabile, supra note 19, at 82 nn.106-09.
114 Goodfelow & Schieber, supra note 96, at 75.
115 Id. at 77 & tbl.4.
116 Id. at77-80 & tbls.6-7.
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levels.' 17 As the authors of the study noted, it is "ironic that the workers who
generally have the least potential to control the operations of the employers for
which they work are the most willing to fully commit their long-term
retirement security to the successful performance of these organizations."',
18
c. Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei case study
Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei conducted a case study of the retirement plan
investment decisions of 20,000 management employees of a large United
States employer.119  The results of this case study were consistent with the
findings of the EBRI and the Goodfellow and Schieber studies, indicating that
a significant number of plan participants overly concentrate investment of their
retirement assets in both non-equity funds and employer stock.
The study grouped the plan's investment options into three main
categories: fixed income (non-equity) funds, diversified equity funds, and
employer stock.120  The study reported participant investment allocations by
gender, and controlled for age, job tenure, and income levels. It found that for
male participants, 41% of their account balance was invested in employer
stock, almost 45% was invested in fixed income funds, and only 14% was
invested in diversified equity funds. 12  For female participants, the per-
centages were similar. On average, 42% of the account balances for female
participants were invested in employer stock, 45% were invested in fixed
income funds, and approximately 13% were invested in diversified equities.
122
Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei found that women in the sample were more likely
than male participants to invest in the conservative fixed income funds and less
likely to invest in diversified equities. 123 The study also found that, consistent
117 Seeid. at 86.
118 Ld. Not only is it ironic, it can have devastating consequences, as the unfortunate employees of Color
Tile, Inc. learned when the company was declared bankrupt See Stabile, supra note 19, at 64 & n. 12; Vanessa
O'Connell & Pui-Wing Tam, Employer Stock May Be Riskyfor Nest Eggs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1998, at C1.
The Color Tile incident prompted Congress to amend ERISA to limit employer-directed investment of
participant 401(k) plan accounts in employer stock to 10% of the account balance. This 10% limitation does
not apply toparticipant-directed investments in employer stock. See discussion infra at notes 380-82.
119 Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei, supra note 109, at 56.
120 See id. at 57. Allocations to a social responsibility equity fund were excluded because of the
nonfinancial objectives that may influence the participant's choice of such a fund. See id.
121 See id at 57 tbl. 3.
'22 See id.
123 Id. at 60. Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei were unwilling to find that their results were conclusive evidence
of gender differences in risk aversion, or that their results necessarily implied that elderly women would be
worse off in retirement. Id. at 60, 62. Other studies have concluded that gender influences investment
decisions. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OsFICE, 401(K) PLANS, supra note 18, at 24; Richard P. Hinz et al.,
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with the findings of the EBRI and Goodfellow and Schieber studies, as




With the exception of company stock, the investment options offered under
participant-directed 401(k) plans tend to be mutual funds.125 Therefore,
another aspect of participant decision-making with respect to investment of
their plan assets is the rate of returns plan participants are likely to achieve on
mutual fund investments.
1 26
DALBAR, Inc. 27 ("DALBAR") conducted a study of mutual fund in-
vestor behavior over a fourteen-year period, from 1984 through 1997.128 The
purpose of the DALBAR study was to determine the "real" investment returns
for mutual fund investors, as compared with the theoretical market investment129
returns frequently quoted in the media. The original 1994 DALBAR study
analyzed money flows in and out of mutual funds from the beginning of 1984
through September 30, 1993. The original study was then updated through
Are Women Conservative Investors? Gender Differences in Participant-Directed Pension Investments, in
POSITIONING PENSIONS, supra note 18, at 91; Judith Bums, Gender Gap In Retirement Investments is Cited,
With Women Too Conservative, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1997, at AS.
124 See Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei, supra note 109, at 61.
125 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 31, Part 2.4.1; William A. Schmidt, The
Marketing of Retirement: Section 401(K) Plans and the Mutual Fund Industry, 1994 INVESTMENT LAW. 1, 17.
In 1996 mutual funds became the largest segment of assets held in 401(k) plans, comprising just over 40% of
asset value. See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 31, Part 2.4.1; see also Ronald D. Hurt,
The Changing Paradigm of 401 (k) Plan Servicing, in LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, supra note
18, at 199; John D. Rea & Richard G. Marcis, Responses of Mutual Fund Investors to Adverse Market
Disruptions, in LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, supra note 18, at 136. Employers sponsoring
participant-directed 401(k) plans use mutual funds as investment options to meet the diversification
requirements of ERISA Section 404(c) for participant-directed plans. See infraPartll.C.1. Mutual funds are
popular among 401(k) plan participants because they can obtain daily valuations of their plan accounts and can
freely change their investments from one mutual fund to another. See Schmidt, supra, at 17.
126 A "mutual fund" is a registered, open-end investment company established pursuant to the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997), that continuously offers to the
public securities (shares in the fund) that can be redeemed by the shareholder on demand. See 1 THOMAS P.
LEMPKE ET AL., REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES, § 1.01, at 1-2 (1999).
127 DALBAR, Inc. is a private company located in Boston, Massachusetts, that conducts research for and
provides services to the financial services industry.
128 DALBAR, INC., QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR STUDY 1-31 (1994); DALBAR
INc., QUANrTTAIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR STUDY, 1997 UPDATE (1998).




1997.131 Three types of mutual funds were measured in the study: equity
funds, fixed income funds, and money market funds. 132  Using sales, re-
demption, and retention rates, the study calculated the cumulative real returns
for investors in the three types of funds, and then compared these returns for
the "benchmark" returns typically used in the three fund classes.
133
The DALBAR study found that, as a result of their investment behavior,
mutual fund investors earn far less than the widely quoted benchmark
returns. 134 The DALBAR study found that for equity funds, although the S&P
500 Index reported an average annual return of 17% per year for 1984 to 1997,
the average equity fund investor during this period earned real returns of only
6.71% per year. 135  The average fixed income fund investor actually fared
better, earning annual returns of 7.24%, but still underperformed all of the
fixed income fund benchmarks. 136  The DALBAR study concluded that the
gaps between real and theoretical (benchmark) returns for the average equity
and fixed income fund investor were the result of attempts by investors to time
the market. 137 Instead, they end up "buying high and selling low," the opposite
of a well-known investment axiom.1
38
4. The Impact of Participant Investment Education and Investment
Advice on Investment Allocation Decisions
An employer who sponsors a participant-directed 401(k) plan is not
required to provide educational materials on retirement savings and investing
to the plan participants. 139 Nevertheless, many employers choose to provide
131 See DALBAR STUDY UPDATE, supra note 128, at 2.
132 See DALBAR STUDY, supra note 128, at 9.
133 See id. For the equity funds, the benchmarks used were the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 Indices.
Benchmarks for the fixed income funds were long-term U.S. Treasury, long-term corporate bonds, and
intermediate fixed-income securities. The benchmark used for the money market funds was the annualized 30-
day yield on U.S. Treasury bills. See id.
134 DALBAR STUDY UPDATE, supra note 128, at 3.
135 Id.
136 Seeid at4thl. 1.
137 See id. at 7, 10.
138 See id. at 11.
139 ERISA requires only that the employer provide participants with a summary plan description, the
mandated contents of which do not include participant investment education, although it may include a
description of the investment options under the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (1994). If the employer desires
to avoid fiduciary liability for losses resulting from participant investment decisions pursuant to ERISA
section 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1994 & Supp. 1111997), the employer must provide certain descriptive
and financial disclosure materials to the plan participants, but these required disclosures need not include
educational materials. See infra Part I.C.
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educational materials to their employees. Two of the three topics most
frequently addressed in educational materials are those related to participant
investment allocation decisions-asset allocation and the attributes of various
plan investment options. 141  Generally, employees are confident in the edu-
cational information provided by their employers1 42 and rely on employer-
provided information as one of the primary sources of investment informa-
tion.' 43 Importantly, those who rely more heavily on employer-provided
investment information tend to be the same types of participants who face the
highest risk of accumulating insufficient retirement assets. These participants
include those who have less money in their plan accounts, have lower incomes,
are younger, have less education, and contribute a small percentage of their
income to the plan.144  Even more importantly, a significant percentage of
employees consistently indicate that they respond to investment allocation
educational materials by changing their plan investment allocation mix. 145
Numerous surveys have found that, of those employees who received and read
the investment allocation education materials, 40-50% changed their plan
investment allocation mix as a result.146
The mere fact that employees may change their investment allocations in
response to education does not necessarily indicate they make the types of
changes that are more likely to result in the accumulation of sufficient plan
assets for retirement.147 This point is illustrated by the results of the EBRI case
study of participant investment allocation decision-making at AT&T, IBM
Corporation, and New York Life Insurance Company. 148 All of the EBRI
140 According to the 1997 Retirement Confidence Survey, two-thirds of the respondents reported that their
employer had provided retirement plan educational materials to them within the last six months. Of these
respondents, 86% reported that they had read the materials. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra
note 64, at 6. Other surveys report similarly high numbers. See EBRI ISSuE BRIM No. 181, supra note 72, at
8; EBRI ISsuE BRIw No. 169, supra note 78, at 6; Yakoboski, supra note 90, at 20-21.
141 See EBRI ISSUE BRMF No. 169, supra note 78, at 11. The third most frequently covered topic is
estimating the amount of income needed for retirement. See id.
142 See id, at 7 (stating that over 75% of all survey respondents said they were confident in the information
provided by their employer).
143 See Yakoboskd, supra note 90, at 22.
144 See id.
145 See Lorraine M. McCarthy, Investments: Most Workers Ill-Equipped to Handle Retirement Savings,
Investment Study Says, Pens. & Bens. Daily (BNA), at d4 (May 4, 1998); Plan Administration: Investment
Education Programs Can Affect Behavior, Buck Survey Says, Pens. & Bens. Daily (BNA), at d10 (Nov. 12,
1997).
146 See EBRI ISSUE BRIF No. 200, supra note 67, at 13; EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra
note 64, at 6; EBRI ISSUE BRIF No. 169, supra note 78, at 7; Yakoboski, supra note 90, at 21.
147 See McCarthy, supra note 145, at d10.
148 See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
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study 401(k) plan participants had the benefit of a well-developed participant
education program.149 Nevertheless, a significant percentage of plan partici-
pants made unconventional investment allocation decisions that would appear
to place them at risk of accumulating insufficient assets for retirement.150
Such a result is not surprising. First, modem portfolio theory is highly
complex, with even experts in the field disagreeing about its proper
application. 151 Second, for reasons related to legal constraints and liability
issues created by ERISA, participant education materials concerning invest-
ment allocation tend to be general in nature. 152 The plan participant receiving
general educational materials must absorb the relatively complex investment
theory principles and concepts contained in the materials, and then apply this
knowledge to the participant's individual financial and lifestyle circumstances.
Given the lack of basic financial knowledge of many plan participants, this can
be a daunting task.
D. Conclusion
The research indicates that plan participants under the individual responsi-
bility model are not a monolithic group. Participants range in their level of
knowledge concerning retirement savings and general financial concepts from
the illiterate to the sophisticated. The research also indicates that plan
participants vary widely in the types of decisions they make under the
individual responsibility model. Some participants make 401(k) plan contribu-
tion and investment allocation decisions that are likely to result in adequate
retirement savings; others do not.
This diversity among plan participants calls for a Department of Labor
administrative approach that is designed to achieve adequate retirement
savings for all plan participants, not just the knowledgeable and capable ones.
Most participants already receive some type of educational materials from their
employers. What they really need, yet do not receive, is investment advice.
Part II explains why.
149 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
150 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei, supra note 109, at 51-52; Veeneman & McWhirter, supra note 91,
at 51-57; Weiss & Sgaraglino, supra note 19, at 1186-90.
152 See infra Part MII.
[Vol. 49
CONFORMING ERISA POLICY TO REALITY
II. ERISA's FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PARTICIPANT EDUCATION AND
INVESTMENT ADVICE
ERISA's statutory scheme is built around the concept of a "fiduciary.
153
A party having fiduciary status is subject to ERISA's statutorily defined legal
duties, transactional prohibitions, and liabilities.154 In contrast, a "non-
fiduciary" who provides services to a plan effectively is exempt from civil
liability to plan participants under ERISA. 55 Furthermore, the "non-fiduciary"
is generally immune from liability under state law by virtue of ERISA's
preemption provisions, 156 and is subject to fewer transactional prohibitions
than a fiduciary. 157  Therefore, ERISA's "line" between fiduciaries and non-
fiduciaries is a critical distinction with far-reaching legal consequences.
Department of Labor interpretations of ERISA's fiduciary provisions have
created a complex and tangled regulatory web. As a result, few employers and
plan service providers today are willing to provide investment advice to plan
113 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,251-54 (1993). ERISA
requires that the plan document must identify at least one named fiduciary (typically the employer or its
agent(s)) who has the authority to control the operation and administration of the plan. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(a) (1994). Other persons are fiduciaries with respect to the plan to the extent they exercise
discretionary authority or control with respect to the management or administration of the plan, render
investment advice for a fee, or exercise authority or control over the management or disposition of the plan's
assets. See id. § 1002(21)(A).
154 See infra Parts I.A., B., D.
155 Under ERISA, a civil claim by a plan participant must fit into one of the statutory civil causes of
actions in section 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994). See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 146-48 (1985). As construed by the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals, section 502(a)
does not authorize a plan participant to bring a civil cause of action under ERISA against a non-fiduciary for
participating in a breach of fiduciary duty by a plan fiduciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994); Central Bank
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 175 (1994) (citing Mertens as ' rejecting
non-fiduciary liability"); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 252-54; LeBlanc v. Cahill, 153 F.3d 134, 150-53 (4th Cir.
1998); Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1998); Herman v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 140
F.3d 1413, 1420-22 (11th Cir. 1998); Reich v. Stangl, 73 F.3d 1027, 1030-33 (10th Cir. 1996); Florin v.
Nationsbank of Georgia, 60 F.3d 1245, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995); Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270,281-84 (3d Cir.
1995); Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d 25, 31-34 (1st Cir. 1994).
156 ERISA section 514 preempts all state statutory, regulatory, and common law, subject to certain limited
exceptions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). Although the Supreme Court has recently indicated a willingness to
limit the breadth of its prior jurisprudence regarding the scope of ERISA preemption, these cases do not appear
to indicate any willingness on the part of the Court to exclude conduct involving the rendering of
administrative-type services to a retirement plan or its participants. See Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Ward, 119 S. Ct., 1380, 1391-92 (1999); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806,
810-11 (1997); California Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. N.A. Inc., 519 U.S. 316
(1997); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658
(1995) (state laws that affect plan administration still preempted).
157 See infra Part ILD.
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participants for fear of becoming an ERISA fiduciary. 158 These interpretations
involve the very heart of ERISA's statutory protections for plan participants-
(1) the definition of fiduciary; (2) fiduciary and co-fiduciary duties; (3) the
Department of Labor's regulations governing participant-directed plans; and
(4) the prohibited transaction rules and exemptions. Each of these areas, and
the obstacles they present to investment advice, are explained below.
A. The "Investment Advisor" as ERISA Fiduciary
ERISA's statutory definition of a fiduciary includes investment advisors.
Under the statutory definition, a person is a fiduciary investment advisor with
respect to an ERISA plan to the extent that a person "renders investment
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any
moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to
do so."1
The obvious ambiguities in the statutory definition led the Department of
Labor to issue a regulation attempting to define the first element of the
statutory definition, the rendering of "investment advice," almost immediately
after the enactment of ERISA. 16  Under the Department of Labor's
interpretation, a person 161 who provides advice, or makes recommendations
concerning plan investments on a regular basis, is deemed to have rendered
"investment advice" so long as two criteria are satisfied. First, the person
providing the advice or making the recommendations must be aware, either by
a mutual agreement, arrangement, or understanding, that the recipient of this
information (either the plan or its fiduciary) is relying on the information as a
primary basis for making investment decisions with respect to plan assets.
162
Second, the advice or recommendations must be individualized to the plan and
based on the particular needs of the plan, such as the plan's investment
158 See infra Part ILE.
"9 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (1994). Several points are noteworthy concerning this statutory
definition. Frst, under the definition the person to whom the advice is being rendered is irrelevant. See id.
Thus, the definition applies equally to investment advice rendered to a plan administrator responsible for
investing the assets of a $100 million defined benefit plan as it does to investment advice rendered to a 401(k)
plan participant responsible for directing the investment of his $10,000 salary deferral account. Second, the
definition has two elements that must both be satisfied for fiduciary status to attach. The person must render
(1) "investment advice" and (2) receive a "direct or indirect" 'fee or other compensation." Id; see also 29
C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(b) & n.3 (1999).
160 See 40 Fed. Reg. 50,843 (1975) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (1999)).
161 A "person" includes affiliated entities. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1)(ii), (e) (1999).
162 See iad § 2510.3-21(c)(1)(ii)(B).
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policies or strategy, overall portfolio composition, or diversification of plan
assets.163
This interpretation originally was targeted at brokers and dealers in the
securities industry who executed securities transactions on behalf of defined
benefit plans.164 The securities industry needed to know whether a broker-
dealer who routinely counseled the plan's sponsoring employer concerning
investments for the plan as part of its customer services, and who received
sales commissions on the resulting plan transactions, was a fiduciary under
ERISA. 65 The industry urged the Department of Labor to interpret the statute
to mean that if the plan's sponsoring employer paid the sales commissions
directly (instead of deducting commissions from plan assets), the "fee or other
compensation" element necessary for fiduciary status would be missing.
166
The Department of Labor rejected this statutory interpretation.167 According to
the Department of Labor's interpretation, the "fee or other compensation"
requirement of section 3(21)(A)(ii) is not limited to payments that come
directly from the plan, but rather includes "all fees or other compensation
incident to the transaction in which the investment advice has been or will be
rendered."'
168
This 1975 Department of Labor interpretation of a fiduciary investment
advisor is the starting point for understanding why 401(k) plan participants
currently do not receive investment advice. To illustrate, assume that the
Company sponsors a 401(k) plan and wants to hire an investment advisor for
the plan participants. If the Company pays the investment advisor for these
services using plan assets, under ERISA's statutory definition the investment
professional clearly will be a fiduciary of the plan. But suppose instead that
the Company is willing to pay the investment advisor using Company assets,
not plan assets. Under the Department of Labor's 1975 interpretation of a
fiduciary investment advisor, the investment advisor would still be a fiduciary
of the plan. As a result, the investment advisor becomes subject to all of the
legal constraints, discussed in subparts B and D below, imposed upon ERISA
plan fiduciaries.
163 See id.
164 See id. § 2510.3-21(d).
165 See id. § 2510.3-21(d)(2); 40 Fed. Reg. 50,842 (1975).
166 See 40 Fed. Reg. at 50,842.
167 See id.
168 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 n.3 (1999); see also Reich v. McManus, 883 F. Supp. 1144, 1153 & n.5 (N.D.
IMl. 1995); 40 Fed. Reg. at 50,842 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 56,760, 56,762 (1976); PWBA. Op. Ltr. 83-60A, 1983
WL 22542 (Nov. 21, 1983).
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The Department of Labor's interpretation of a fiduciary investment advisor
also is the starting point for understanding why educational materials on
retirement planning and plan investments provided to plan participants tend to
be very general in nature. Today, plan service providers, like securities
brokers in 1975, oftentimes receive fees generated by the plan's mutual fund
investments. 169 Thus, as a practical matter, the "fee or other compensation"
element required to be a fiduciary investment advisor is always satisfied. If the
plan service provider is a fiduciary, receipt of these fees is prohibited under
ERISA. 17  To avoid becoming a fiduciary, the service provider must scrupu-
lously avoid satisfying the other element necessary to become an investment
advisor: the rendering of "investment advice." As a result, service providers
carefully avoid investment advisor status by providing only general educa-
tional information rather than materials and other assistance responsive to the
needs and circumstances of the individual participant.
171
B. Fiduciary and Co-Fiduciary Responsibilities
ERISA section 404(a)(1) establishes four broadly-defined fundamental
duties governing the conduct of all ERISA fiduciaries. 172  For purposes of
participant retirement savings education and investment advice under ERISA,
the most significant section 404(a)(1) duties include the duty of care, the duty
of loyalty (also known as the exclusive benefit rule),173 and the duty of prudent• • ti 174
diversification. ERISA's duty of care requires that the employer who is the
named fiduciary of a retirement plan manage the plan with the "care, skill,
prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
169 See infra Part II.D.
170 See infra Part lID.
171 See Jeffrey M. Miller, DOL Clarifles "Advice" vs. "Education, " PEN. MGMT., Feb. 1, 1996, at 26.
172 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1) (1994). Congress intended these statutory duties to codify the principles of
fiduciary conduct developed under the common law of trusts, but with modifications appropriate for retirement
plan trusts. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996); Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1488 (9th
Cir. 1996); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122 n.19 (7th Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455,
1464 n.15 (5th Cir. 1983); H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649-51; S.
REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,4866; H.R. CoN. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5076.
173 See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 17, at 649.
174 An ERISA fiduciary is personally liable for breach of its fiduciary duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)
(1994). Under ERISA section 410(a) any attempt to relieve an ERISA fiduciary from its statutorily prescribed
duties and liability through an exculpatory clause in the plan document is void as against public policy. See id.
§ 1110(a); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 344-45. A person who is (or is subsequently determined
by a court to be) a fiduciary under the statutory definition with respect to a retirement plan cannot avoid the
fiduciary responsibilities and liability imposed by ERISA by simply declaring to the plan participants that it is
not a fiduciary. See AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 345-46.
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man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims." 175  The
employer's duty of care includes the duty prudently to select and monitor the
activities of both co-fiduciaries to the plan, including any investment advisors,
and non-fiduciary service providers. 176 ERISA's duty of loyalty requires that
the fiduciary investment advisor discharge its duties "solely in the interest" of
the plan participants and "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants."
ERISA's duty of prudent diversification requires the employer to diversify
the investment of plan assets in order to minimize the risk of large losses, 78 if
an employer sponsors a plan where each participant directs the investment of
his or her own account, but the plan fails to meet the Department of Labor's
regulations governing participant-directed plans,'79 the sponsoring employer
remains subject to the fiduciary duty of prudent diversification. 180
In addition to the general fiduciary duties of section 404(a)(1), ERISA
section 405(a)181 creates co-fiduciary responsibilities. If the employer sponsor-
175 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see also Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362,371 (7th Cir. 1998); Donovan
v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1983); Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1464.
176 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-8, FR-14, 2509.96-1(e) (1999); ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE
WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
GUIDANCE IN SELECTING AND MONITORING SERVICE PROVIDERS 2-6 (1996); PWBA Op. Ltr. 97-16A, Pens.
Plan Guide (CCH) 199860 (May 22, 1997).
177 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). ERJSA's duty of loyalty is derived from the principle under the common
law of trusts that the fiduciary must avoid conflicts of interest in carrying out its fiduciary duties. SeeEavesv.
Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 (1959); GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481, at 225-79 (2d ed.
rev'd 1978); 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, SCoTr ON TRUSTS § 170, at
311-14 (4th ed. 1987).
178 See 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1)(C). The House Conference Report on ERISA describes this duty of
prudent diversification as follows:
The degree of investment concentration that would violate this requirement to diversify cannot be
stated as a fixed percentage, because a prudent fiduciary must consider the facts and circumstances
of each case. The factors to be considered include (1) the purposes of the plan; (2) the amount of
the plan assets; (3) financial and industrial conditions; (4) the type of investment, whether
mortgages, bonds, or shares of stock or otherwise; (5) distribution as to geographic location; (6)
distribution as to industries; (7) the dates of maturity.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,5084-85.
179 See infra Part II.C.
180 This creates obvious and serious potential fiduciary liabilities for the employer for plan investment
losses because the participants have selected the investments, and their selections may not have been prudent
or diversified. See supra Part I.C.
"' 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1994).
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ing a 401(k) plan has engaged a fiduciary investment advisor to counsel plan
participants, the employer is subject to these section 405(a) co-fiduciary duties
vis-h-vis the fiduciary investment advisor. 182  The employer will be liable for
breach of its co-fiduciary duties under section 405(a) if the employer (1)
knowingly participates in or attempts to conceal a fiduciary breach by the
fiduciary investment advisor;183 (2) breaches one of the employer's own
fiduciary duties, and thereby enables the fiduciary investment advisor to breach
one of its section 404(a)(1) fiduciary duties; or (3) has knowledge of a
fiduciary breach by the investment advisor and fails to make reasonable efforts
to remedy the breach. 1
85
For the employer sponsoring the 401(k) plan, potential co-fiduciary
liability under the second alternative, section 405(a)(2), is the most worrisome.
Section 405(a)(2) does not require the employer to have actual knowledge of
the investment advisor's fiduciary breach in order to trigger the employer's co-
fiduciary liability.186  This means that the employer's co-fiduciary liability
could be triggered unknowingly as a result of a breach of the duty of care by
the advisor, such as a failure to monitor the activities of the co-fiduciary
investment advisor. 187
182 See id. Section 405(c)(1) of ERISA allows the employer as the named plan fiduciary to incorporate a
procedure in the governing plan document to designate another person, such as a fiduciary investment advisor,
to carry out fiduciary responsibilities under the plan. Id. § 1105(c)(1). Such a designation by the named
fiduciary does not, however, relieve the employer of its potential co-fiduciary liability under section 405(a).
See id. § 1105(c)(2)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-14 (1999). The employer also remains subject to the duty
of care in selecting and retaining the delegated fiduciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(2)(A)(i), (iii).
183 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1).
'84 Id. § 1105(a)(2).
'85 Id. § 1105(a)(3).
186 See Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 304-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); PBGC v. Ross, 781 F. Supp. 415,419-
20 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
187 See sources cited supra note 176. A fiduciary who breaches any of the duties contained in sections
404(a)(1) is personally liable under ERISA section 409(a) to make good any losses to the plan resulting from
the breach and to restore to the plan any profits that have been made through the use of plan assets by the
fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994). A statutory interpretation question arises under ERISA section 502(a)
where an investment advisor breaches its fiduciary duties concerning the investment advice rendered to a
participant. Has the fiduciary breach injured "the plan" or the individual participant? See Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985) (section 502(a)(2) claim for fiduciary liability under section
409(a) limited to "plan-wide" relief). This distinction is critical because if the injury is deemed to be only to
the individual participant and not to "the plan" under section 409(a), the injured participant must bring an
ERISA civil enforcement action under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994). See Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 509-10 (1996). Relief for any claim under this section is limited to "traditional
equitable relief," and, unlike a claim for relief under section 502(a)(2) for liability under section 409(a), cannot
include monetary damages. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,257-59 (1993). In this situation the
better statutory interpretation is that liability exists under section 409(a) because the conduct involved the
investment of plan assets. In the case of co-fiduciary liability under section 405, both fiduciaries usually are
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C. Participant-Directed Plans and the 404(c) Regulations
Section 404(c)(1) of ERISA 188 authorizes participant-directed plans by
creating an exception to the employer's fiduciary duties of care and prudent
diversification. 18' Under this exception, if the participant fails to diversify his
account and invests all the account assets in a single stock, the employer will
not be liable for any resulting investment losses.190 This exception is limited to
liability for plan asset investment losses that occur as a direct result of the
participant's exercise of control over the assets held in the participant's plan
account. 19 1
1. Overview of the 404(c) Regulations
The key concept underlying section 404(c) is the exercise of independent
control over investment decisions by each plan participant." Rather than
defining this concept of independent control, both the language of section
404(c) and its legislative history left this task to the Department of Labor to
resolve through the issuance of regulations ("404(c) Regulations").193
jointly and severally liable. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 295 & n.245.
188 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1111997). ERISA section 404(c)(1) states:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and permits a
participant or beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his account if a participant or
beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of the
Secretary)-
(A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a fiduciary by reason of such
exercise, and
(B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be liable under this part for any loss, or by
reason of any breach, which results from such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.
Id. Section 404(c)(1) originally was numbered as section 404(c) of ERISA, but was renumbered as part of
amendments to ERISA made by the Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110
Stat. 1755.
189 See supra Part l.B for a discussion of these duties.
190 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,5084-85.
191 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(a), (d)(2) (1999); 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906,46,924-25 (1992).
'92 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(a), (c); 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,924-25.
193 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1). Although section 404(c) was originally enacted as part of ERISA in 1974,
the Department of Labor did not issue proposed regulations until 1987. See 52 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (1987). The
1987 proposed regulations were withdrawn and a new set of proposed regulations were issued in 1991. See 56
Fed. Reg. 10,724 (1991). In 1992, the 1991 proposed regulations were modified and reissued as final
regulations nearly 20 years after the original enactment of ERISA section 404(c). See 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906
(1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-1). See generally Michael S. Sirkin, The 20 Year History of ERISA,
68 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 321, 323-24 (1994).
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The 404(c) Regulations provide a strong legal incentive for employers to
allow participants to direct the investment of their retirement savings accounts.
Technically, compliance with the 404(c) Regulations is optional. An employer
who sponsors a participant-directed 401(k) plan that fails to comply with the
404(c) Regulations has not, merely because of such noncompliance, breached
its fiduciary duties under ERISA.194 Noncompliance with the 404(c) Regula-
tions means that the employer continues to be responsible, and thus potentially
liable, for the prudent investment and diversification of the participant
accounts under the plan, despite the fact that the participants have made the
investment decisions themselves. 195  Given the unconventional investment
decisions made by many plan participants, application of this regulation may
lead to significant potential employer liability, particularly in times of market
volatility or decline.
For the employer, compliance with the 404(c) Regulations has two
significant legal consequences. First, the employer is relieved of liability for
any investment losses resulting from the participant's investment decisions.
196
Second, the participant who manages the investment of his plan account is not
a fiduciary. 197 Therefore, the employer is not subject to potential co-fiduciary
liability for the participant's imprudent investment decisions.
198
The 404(c) Regulations describe the conditions that must be satisfied for a
participant to be deemed to have exercised independent control over the assets
in his account. First, the participant must have the opportunity to choose from
a broad range of investment alternatives, 199 which may include employer
securities. 2°°  Second, the participant must be able to give investment
194 See 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906-07.
195 See id. at 46,907.
196 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(i).
197 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(1).
'9' See 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,924.
199 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(1)(ii), (b)(3). Under the 404(c) Regulations, a plan provides the
requisite broad range of investment alternatives only if the investment options under the plan offer participants
the opportunity materially to affect the potential return on the assets in the participant's plan account. The plan
must offer at least three investment alternatives, each of which is diversified and has materially different risk
and return characteristics. In addition, the participant must have the opportunity to diversify investments so as
to minimize the risk of large losses. See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(3). Mutual funds are particularly well-suited to
satisfy these diversification requirements because, unlike investments in individual stocks, they can provide
diversification for small investment amounts. See Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas MJ. Kerwin,
Organization of a Mutual Fund, 49 BUs. LAw. 107 (1993).
200 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4); 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,926-28. The 404(c) Regulations
subject employer securities to special requirements. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(vii),
(d)C2)(ii)(E)(4).
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instructions with a frequency that is apropriate in light of the market volatility
of the plan's investment alternatives. Third, the participant must be able to
diversify investments within and among investment alternatives so as to
minimize the risks of large losses.20 2  Finally, the participant must obtain
"sufficient information" to make informed investment decisions.20 3 Assuming
these criteria are satisfied, the employer will not be liable for investment losses
incurred by plan participants who direct the investment of their plan
accounts.
2. Assumptions Concerning Participant Decision-Making Competence
The 404(c) Regulations divide the universe of "sufficient information" that
must be furnished to the plan participants into two categories: information that
must be supplied to all plan participants (mandatory information),205 andinformation that must be provided only if requested by a plan participant
201 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l(b)(1)(i), (b)(2)(ii)(C). The plan may place restrictions on the frequency
with which participants may give investment instructions so long as the restrictions are reasonable. See iL §
2550A04c-l(b)(2)(ii)(C). At least three of the investment alternatives must allow participants to give
investment instructions no less frequently than once within any three month period. Participants also must be
given the opportunity to move from a more volatile investment alternative to a less volatile investment
alternative within the broad range of investment options offered by the plan. Special rules apply to
investments in employer securities. See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(ii)(C)(3).
202 See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(1)(ii), (b)(3)(i)(C).
203 See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B).
204 The 401(c) Regulations provide for three narrow exceptions to this rule. The employer will not be
relieved from potential fiduciary liability for investment losses only if (I) the participant was subject to
"improper influence" by a plan fiduciary or the plan sponsor with respect to the transaction; (2) the plan
fiduciary has concealed material, non-public, but lawfully disclosable facts regarding the investment from the
participant; or (3) the participant is legally incompetent and the responsible fiduciary accepting the
participant's investment direction actually knows that the participant is legally incompetent. IL § 2550.404c-
l(c)(2).
205 Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1). The mandatory information category includes the following
materials: (1) an explanation that the plan is intended to constitute an ERISA section 404(c) plan and that plan
fiduciaries may be relieved of liability for losses which are the result of participants' investment instructions;
(2) a description of the investment alternatives available under the plan, including a general description of the
investment objectives and risk and return characteristics of each alternative; (3) an explanation of how to give
investment instructions, any limits or restrictions on giving instructions, and any restrictions on the exercise of
voting, tender or similar rights; (4) a description of any transaction fees or expenses that are charged to the
participant's account; and (5) a description of the additional information that is available on request and the
identity of the person(s) responsible for providing that information. See iL If the participant makes an
investment in an investment alternative that is subject to federal securities laws, the participant must be given a
copy of the most recent prospectus (unless the prospectus was furnished immediately before the participant's
investment). Seeid. Ifthe investment involves the exercise of voting, render or similar rights, and these rights
are passed through to participants, the participant also must receive any materials related to the exercise of
these rights. See L
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("upon request ' information)."' Significantly, the 404(c) Regulations express-
ly state that the employer is not required to provide investment advice to the
plan participants. 0 7 Equally significant is that the list of mandatory and upon
request information required under the 404(c) Regulations 2°8 does not include
the types of basic retirement savings educational materials that many plan
participants might want or need as a prerequisite to making informed
investment decisions. Instead, the information to be provided to plan
participants pursuant to the 404(c) Regulations, although voluminous, is
directed at the level of a financially sophisticated investor. For example, plan
participants receive a prospectus that meets the requirements of federal
securities laws,209 proxy materials for exercise of voting and tender rights,
210
financial statements,211 and a description of investment management fees,
administrative fees, and transaction fees and costs.
212
The informational disclosure requirements of the 404(c) Regulations
assume that all plan participants are knowledgeable and financially sophisti-
cated investors capable of making their own investment decisions. 21  Such a
monolithic view of the universe of plan participants is contradicted by
evidence from studies of participant retirement savings knowledge and
investment behavior.
214
206 See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(2). The "upon request" information category includes the following
materials: (1) a description of the annual operating expenses of the plan's investment alternatives, including
any investment management fees; (2) copies of any prospectuses, financial statements and reports and other
information furnished to the plan relating to an investment alternative; (3) a listing of assets comprising the
portfolio of each investment alternative that holds plan assets; (4) information concerning the value of shares
or units in investment alternatives available under the plan along with information concerning the past and
current investment performance of each alternative; and (5) information concerning the value of shares or units
in investment alternatives held in the account of the participant. Id.
207 Id. § 2550.404c-l(c)(4); 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906,46,913,46,922 (1992) (plan sponsors are not required to
bring plan participants up to the level of financial expertise of the fiduciaries of the plan).
208 See supra notes 206-07.
209 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(viii), (B)(2)(ii).
210 See id. § 2550.404e-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(ix).
211 See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(ii).
212 See id. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B)(l)(v), (B)(2)(i).
213 Under the 404(c) Regulations, a participant's investment direction is not an exercise of independent
control only if the participant is legally incompetent and the fiduciary responsible for implementing the
investment direction has actual knowledge that the participant is legally incompetent. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-l(c)(2)(iii). There is no affirmative duty on the part of the fiduciary responsible for carrying out
the participant's investment direction to ascertain the competence, legal or otherwise, of the directing
participant. See 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,922 n.24 (1992).
214 See supra Part I.C.
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3. Employer Fiduciary Responsibilities
Approximately one-third of plan participants under the individual
responsibility model would prefer to leave the task of investing their retirement
savings up to their employer.215 Under the 404(c) Regulations, the employer is
not required expressly to give participants the choice of "opting out" of the
responsibility for investment decisions.216 The 404(c) Regulations do require
that the participant must first make an affirmative investment direction to
trigger the employer's exemption from fiduciary liability for investment
losses.217 Until the participant gives an affirmative investment direction, the
employer retains fiduciary responsibility for the prudent diversification of the
participant's account.218  The employer is not required, however, to disclose
this fact expressly to the plan participants. 19 Therefore, as a practical matter,
plan participants are (mis)led to believe that, like it or not, they must select
among the plan's investment options.22°
215 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
216 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-1.
217 57 Fed. Reg. at 46907,46923-24.
218 See ia. This fiduciary investment responsibility may become significant to the extent employers take
advantage of a recent revenue ruling by the Internal Revenue Service. See Rev. Rul. 98-30, 1998-25 I.R.B. 8.
Prior to Revenue Ruling 98-30, ERISA tax lawyers believed that Internal Revenue Code section 401(k) and its
implementing regulations required that the employee affirmatively elect to contribute part of his compensation
to the plan in lieu of receiving cash. If the employee failed to make such an election, the employer had to pay
the employee's compensation in cash to the employee. Revenue Ruling 98-30 reverses the conventional
understanding of ERISA tax lawyers concerning section 401(k). Employers who desire to increase the
participation levels of their employees in 401(k) plans may structure the plan so that an employee's
compensation is automatically reduced by a fixed percentage and contributed on the employee's behalf to the
401(k) plan. The employee must affirmatively elect not to participate in the 401(k) plan and receive the full
amount of his compensation in cash. See id. The underlying purpose of this type of plan design is to cause
higher participation rates among employees due to the fact that a certain number of employees simply never
will bother to request and complete the paperwork necessary to elect affirmatively out of the deferral
arrangement. The potential ERISA trap for employers is that some participants who never affirmatively
decided to participate in the 401(k) plan may be more likely not to make an affirmative direction regarding the
investment of their plan assets, thus leaving the employer with a fiduciary duty under ERISA section 404(a)(1)
to invest the undirected portion of these participant accounts. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,923.
219 Disclosure of the employer's fiduciary duty to invest plan assets prudently until the participant makes
an affirmative investment direction is not contained in the list of mandatory or upon request information that
must be provided to plan participants under the 404(c) Regulations. See supra notes 205-06.
220 For ease of administration, section 404(c) plans typically are designed so that part of the paperwork
necessary for the participant to enroll in the plan includes a form directing the plan trustee how to invest
participant contributions to the plan. Therefore, the plan participant is left with the impression that all
paperwork, including the investment direction form, must be completed in order for the participant to enroll in
the plan. Once this investment direction form has been completed, the investment direction will continue to
apply to each new contribution to the plan (via automatic payroll deduction of salary deferrals), unless the
direction is affirmatively revoked by the plan participant.
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The other significant fiduciary duties retained by an employer who
sponsors a participant-directed plan involve specific applications of the
employer's duty of care.221 The employer's duty of care includes the duty
prudently to select, retain, and monitor the activities of service providers to the
222plan. The employer must prudently select and monitor the ongoing
appropriateness of the plan's menu of investment options,223 and monitor the
reasonableness of the fees paid to service providers from plan assets. 224
D. The Prohibited Transaction Rules and Exemptions
The financial services entities-banks, trust companies, insurance
companies, securities brokerage firms, and mutual fund companies-that
provide the employer with both administrative plan services and access to the
plan's investment options also are capable of providing investment advice to
225participants. In today's financial world, these entities often have complex
fee arrangements in place, directly or indirectly, between the respective entity
and the mutual funds offered as investment options under the plan.226 These
fee arrangements between the plan's mutual fund investment options and the
plan's service provider oftentimes create a potential conflict of interest that,
221 The remaining section 404(a)(1) fiduciary duties retained by an employer who sponsors a section
404(c) plan are technical in nature and do not present potential legal obstacles to participant retirement
education and investment advice. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(d)(2).
222 See sources cited supra note 176.
M See 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,924 n.27; PWBA Op. Ltr. 97-15A, 1997 ERISA LEXIS 18 (May 22, 1997).
224 See PWBA Op. Ltr. 97-16A, Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) 19,9860 (May 22, 1997); PWBA Op. Ltr. 97-
15A, 1997 ERISA LEXIS 18 (May 22, 1997); PWBA Op. Ltr. 93-13A, n.5, 1993 WL 188472 (Apr. 27, 1993);
PWBA Op. Ltr. 93-12A, n.3 1993 WL 188471 (Apr. 27, 1993).
225 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 31, Parts 2.6-2.7.
226 For a general overview of the types of business arrangements and fees in the financial services sector,
see the Department of Labor's 1998 report, PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 31, Parts 2.7,
3.3-3.4. For specific "real life" examples, the reader is referred to the factual descriptions underlying requests
to the Department of Labor by Shearson Lehman (now Smith Barney), Prudential, Paine Webber, Wells Fargo
Bank, and the Trust Company of the West for individual administrative relief from ERISA's prohibited
transaction rules. These real life examples are contained in the sources cited infra in notes 345-46 and 352-54.
Other examples of strategic business alliances between plan service providers and mutual funds ("bundled"
services) are described in PWBA Op. Ltr. 97-16A, Pens. Plan Guide (CCII) 1 19,9860; 1 LEMPKE ET AL.,
supra note 126, § 25.02, at 25-4, § 25.03, at 25-19 to -20; Leonard P. Larrabee, 11, Update On Strategic
Alliances in the 401(K) Market, in PENSION PLAN INVESTMENTS 11 (PLI Tax L & Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. J-397, 1997); Schmidt, supra note 125, at 17; Mary Romano, For One-Step Money Managing,
Clients Are Turning to "Bundled" 401(K) Plans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1994, at A5. Payment of fees out of
mutual fund assets is restricted under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1994). See
generally 1 LEMPKE ET AL., supra note 126, § 7.03, at 7-13 to 7-17, § 7.05, at 7-18 to 7-33. The federal
Securities and Exchange Commission interprets and enforces the provisions of the Investment Company Act.
See generally id Chs. 1-1 to 1-5, 2-1 to 2-16.
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under ERISA's fiduciary prohibited transaction rules, prevents the plan's
service provider from providing investment advice to the plan participants.227
The ERISA prohibited transaction rules applicable to individual account
plans are set forth in section 406.228 Section 406 creates two sets of prohibited
transaction rules. Section 406(a) describes transactions prohibited for all
"parties in interest,' 229 which include both non-fiduciary plan service
230 231providers230 and fiduciaries of the plan. Section 406(b) describes additional
transactions prohibited only to fiduciaries of the plan.2 2  The section 406(b)
fiduciary prohibited transactions are derived from the common law trust
principle that a fiduciary must have an undivided duty of loyalty to the trust for
which it acts.233 Section 406(b)(1) prohibits a fiduciary from engaging in self-
dealing with respect to plan assets. Section 406(b)(2) prohibits a fiduciary
from engaging in transactions using plan assets where the fiduciary has a
227 See Tina Ruyter, Advice for Sale, PLAN SPONSOR, Dec., Jan. 1998, at 55. In 1997, the Department of
Labor issued two advisory opinion letters clarifying the conditions under which the receipt by a service
provider of certain types of fees under bundled services arrangements would not be considered a prohibited
transaction. See PWBA Op. Ltr. 97-16A, Pens. Plan Guide (CCII) 19,9860; PWBA Op. Ltr. 97-15A, 1997
ERISA LEXIS 18; Advisory Opinions: Labor Department Says Service Providers Must Disclose Payments
from Mutual Funds, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA), at d2 (June 2, 1997). In both situations, however, the service
provider was not also rendering investment advice to plan participants. See id
228 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1994). ERISA's prohibited transaction rules are loosely based upon the common
law of trusts, which imposed a duty of undivided loyalty upon the trustee in transactions dealing with trust
assets, and which allowed transactions between a third party and the trust to be set aside if the trustee was
improperly influenced by the third party or allowed the trust to engage in a transaction on less than arms-
length terms. See Morton Klevan, The Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty Under ERISA Section 406(b)(1), 23 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 561, 563 (1988). ERISA's prohibited transaction rules are more expansive than the
rules developed under the common law of trusts in that they create broad categories of transactions involving
plan assets that are prohibited based solely on the structure of the transaction, even if the transaction was
entered into in good faith, and irrespective of whether the transaction was the result of improper influence or
was detrimental to the plan. See id. at 563-64.
Excise tax penalties are assessed on the party who engages in the prohibited transaction with the plan.
See I.R.C. § 4975(a), (b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997); AMEICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 319-20; William
P. Wade & Richard I. Loebl, Individual Prohibited Transaction Exemptions: The "Common Law," 29 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. 1. 185, 193 (1994). If the prohibited transaction is not "corrected" (i.e., not rescinded)
after notice of the violation is given by the Internal Revenue Service, the excise tax penalty becomes equal to
100% of the amount of the prohibited transaction. See I.R.C. § 4975(b). In addition, the Department of Labor
may seek injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief for violations. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) (1994);
Reich v. Stangl, 73 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 1996); Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270,285-87 (3d Cir. 1995);
Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1994).
229 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (1994).
230 See id. § 1002(14)(B).
231 See id. § 1002(14)(A).
232 See id. § 1106(b).
233 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(e)(1) (1999); Klevan, supra note 228, at 561-62.
234 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1). See generally AMER CIAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 312-15.
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conflict of interest. 235  Finally, section 406(b)(3) prohibits a fiduciary from
receiving a "kickback" from other parties who are connected with a transaction
involving plan assets.
236
ERISA section 408237 contains a number of statutory exemptions to the
section 406 prohibited transaction rules. The Department of Labor has
administrative authority to interpret ERISA's prohibited transaction rules and
statutory exemptions238 and to issue administrative exemptions from the
prohibited transaction rules, including administrative exemptions from the
section 406(b) fiduciary prohibited transactions. 39 Administrative relief from
235 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2). See generally AERICANBAR ASS'N, supra note 17, at 312, 315-17.
236 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3). See generally AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 17, at 312, 317-18.
237 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (1994 & Supp. In 1997).
238 As originally enacted, ERISA gave the Department of Labor and the Treasury Department dual
jurisdiction over the prohibited transaction rules. Thus, the Department of Labor had interpretive and
exemptive authority over ERISA's prohibited transaction rules and the Treasury Department had interpretive
and exemptive authority over the prohibited transaction rules under the Internal Revenue Code applicable to
qualified plans. When this dual jurisdiction scheme proved administratively difficult, President Carter
proposed, and Congress approved, Reorganization Plan No. 4. See Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1978 § 102(a), 43
Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978). Under Reorganization Plan No. 4, the Treasury Department transferred almost all of
its interpretive and exemptive authority over the Internal Revenue Code's prohibited transaction rules to the
Department of Labor. See id.; see also AMERICAN BAR AS'N, supra note 17, at 7, 37-38. At the time, one of
the limited areas over which the Treasury Department retained jurisdiction was the application of the Internal
Revenue Code's prohibited transaction rules to participant-directed transactions involving plan assets that were
exempted by ERISA section 404(c) from ERISA's general fiduciary duty rules. See Reorg. Plan No. 4 of
1978, § 102(a); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,928 (1992) ("[IThe authority to grant administrative
exemptions for section 404(c) transactions remains with the Treasury Department pursuant to the
Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978."). But see Wade & Loebl, supra note 228, at 193-94 ("Labor has the last
word on the extent of Treasury's authority."). Although not articulated, the likely rationale for giving the
Treasury Department sole jurisdiction over prohibited transactions arising in the context of participant-directed
404(c) plans was that the participant's directing the investment of his or her account was functionally
analogous to ownership of an individual retirement account ("IRA"). IRAs generally are not subject to Title I
of ERISA, see 29 U.S.C.§ 1004(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(d) (1999), but are subject to
the prohibited transaction rules of the Internal Revenue Code, see I.R.C. § 408(e)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. II
1997). The interpretation of prohibited transactions involving 404(c) plan assets engaged in by nonparticipant
fiduciaries to the plan, however, is still under the sole jurisdiction of the Department of Labor. See Wade &
Loebl, supra note 228, at 193-94 & nn. 22-24.
29 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a). To issue an administrative exemption, the Department of Labor must find that
the proposed transaction satisfies three criteria: (1) the exemption must be administratively feasible; (2) it must
be in the interests of the plan, its participants and its beneficiaries; and (3) it must be protective of the rights of
plan participants and beneficiaries. See id. § 1108(a)(1)-(3). Congress's rationale in permitting administrative
exemptions to the prohibited transaction rules was twofold. First, Congress reasoned that some otherwise
prohibited transactions "nevertheless should be allowed in order not to disrupt the established business
practices of financial institutions which often performol fiduciary functions in connection with these plans
consistent with adequate safeguards to protect employee benefit plans." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 309
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5089-90. Second, Congress believed that certain prohibited
transactions should be permitted because they have the potential for "benefit to the community as a whole" if
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ERISA's section 406(b) fiduciary prohibited transaction rules does not relieve
the plan fiduciary from its other fiduciary responsibilities under sections 404(a)
and 405.'24
The most important statutory exemptions under section 408 for today's
individual responsibility model are those in section 408(b)(2). This exemption
allows any non-fiduciary who provides services to the plan to be paid out of
plan assets no more than reasonable compensation for its services.24 1  The
section 408(b)(2) statutory exemption is not applicable, however, to a section
406(b) prohibited transaction between the plan and a plan fiduciary.242 In such
a situation, the plan fiduciary's only alternative is to qualify for an administra-
tive exemption for relief from the section 406(b) fiduciary prohibited
transaction rules.
The following series of simple hypothetical examples illustrate how
ERISA's fiduciary prohibited transaction rules operate to deter plan service
providers from providing fiduciary investment advice to plan participants.
they provide "substantial safeguards" for plan participants. Id. at 310, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5090.
Administrative exemptions from the prohibited transaction rules may be issued for a "class" of
fiduciaries or transactions ("class exemptions"), or for an individual fiduciary or transaction ("individual
exemptions"). See Wade & Loebl, supra note 228, at 192. Section 408(b) statutory exemptions and class
exemptions are similar in that a person desiring to take advantage of the exemption need only meet the terms
and conditions of the exemption in order to qualify for relief. See 29 C.F.R. § 2570.49(c) (1999); AMERICAN
BAR AS'N, supra note 17, at 327. Individual exemptions differ from statutory and class exemptions in that
the person seeking administrative relief must submit an individual application to the Department of Labor. See
29 C.F.R. § 2570.32-35 (1999). If the Department of Labor grants the request for individual exemptive relief,
the exemption is valid only for that particular person and the particular transaction, and cannot be relied upon
by similarly situated persons engaging in similar transactions. See Wade & Loebl, supra note 228, at 199-200;
29 C.F.R. § 2570.49(c). Individual exemptions are often sought when a proposed transaction is similar to a
transaction satisfying the criteria for a class exemption but does not quite satisfy those criteria itself. A series
of individual exemptions may lead eventually to the issuance of a class exemption.
240 See 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744, 59,747 (1997) (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60); 57 Fed. Reg.
11,514, 11,522 (1992) (proposed Prohibited Transaction Exemption 92-77); 49 Fed. Reg. 13,208, 13,211
(1984) (proposed Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24); 42 Fed. Reg. 18,732 (1977) (Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 77-4).
241 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(o)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1999).
242 The statutory language at the beginning of section 408(b) could have been interpreted by the
Department of Labor as exempting both non-fiduciary service providers from the prohibited transaction rules
of section 406(a) and fiduciaries who rendered investment advisory services for compensation from the
prohibited transaction rules of section 406(b). See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b). The Department of Labor did not
adopt this statutory interpretation. Rather, the Department's position is that the section 408(b)(2) statutory
exemption allowing payment of not more than reasonable compensation out of plan assets applies only to
payments to non-fiduciary service providers that otherwise would be prohibited by section 406(a). See 29
C.F.R. § 408b-2(a), (e).
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Assume the Company sponsors a participant-directed 401(k) plan for its
employees. The Company uses a local brokerage firm ("Service Provider") to
execute the participants' investment directives. First, begin with the assump-
tion that the Service Provider does not render investment advice to the plan's
participants. If a participant directs the Service Provider to sell 100 shares of
ABC Company stock in his plan account, and to buy XYZ Company stock
instead, the Service Provider receives a sales commission on the transaction. If
the amount of the commission is paid out of plan assets, i.e., deducted from the
participant's plan account, as long as the commission is disclosed and is
reasonable in amount, the payment of the commission out of plan assets
qualifies for the section 408(b)(2) prohibited transaction exemption. 3
This example provides a starting point for purposes of illustration, but it is
not reflective of most participant-directed plans. Currently, few section 404(c)
plans allow the plan participants to choose among the world of potential
individual stock or other investments because of the difficulty inherent in
valuing and reporting the variety of investments held in each participant's
account.244  Participant-directed plans typically offer mutual funds as
investment options245 to satisfy the 404(c) Regulations, which require that the• 246
plan offer a diversified range of at least three investment options. Taking
the illustration above, assume that instead of directing the Service Provider to
buy and sell individual stocks, the participant directs the Service Provider to
sell his shares of Mutual Fund A and buy shares of Mutual Fund B. Mutual
Fund B might charge a sales commission to the participant-in mutual fund
parlance, a "load" charge to invest in the fund.24  The more likely scenario
today, however, is that Mutual Fund B is a "no load" fund, i.e., it does not
charge an up front load sales commission in the traditional sense.248 In a no-load mutual fund, various fees are deducted each year from mutual fund assets,
243 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
244 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 31, at Part 2.4, tbl. 11-3 (estimating that only
one percent of 401(k) plan assets are allocated to self-directed brokerage accounts); Jon C. Chambers,
Unrestricted Investment Accounts in Participant-Directed Plans: Problems and Solutions, 52 EMPLOYEE
BENEFrr PLAN REV. 42 (1997).
245 See sources cited supra note 125.
246 See supra Part II.C.
247 See 1 LEMIKE Er AL., supra note 126, § 7.05, at 7-18.
248 The availability of these "no-load" mutual funds was greatly accelerated in 1980 when the Securities
and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 12b-1 pursuant to section 12(b) of the Investment Company Act of
1940. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (1999); 1 IEMPKE Er AL, supra note 126, § 7.05, at 7-18 to -33; Lee B.
Burgunder & Karl 0. Hartmann, The Mutual Fund Industry and Rule 12b-1 Plans: An Assessment, 15 SEC.
REG. L.J. 364, 371-73 (1988); Derwood J. Haskell, Mutual Fund Distribution Expenses: Shareholder
Investment Costs and the Propriety of 12b-1 Plans, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 453,483-85 (1987).
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based on a percentage of the assets held in Fund B. 249 Pursuant to its business
arrangement with the Service Provider, the mutual fund company shares part
of the fees deducted from the assets of Mutual Fund B with the Service
Provider.250  Alternatively, if the Service Provider is also the mutual fund
company itself (or an affiliate), the mutual fund company retains all of the fees
generated by the mutual funds.25 1  Unlike the direct deduction of a sales
commission from a participant's plan account assets, these fees, 252 because
they are deducted at the mutual fimd level out of mutual fund assets, escape the
prohibited transaction rules of Section 406(a) for nonfiduciaries altogether,
even though plan assets are invested in the mutual fund.253
Compare this scenario with the situation in which the Service Provider
agrees to render fiduciary investment advice to the plan's participants.
Because the Service Provider is now a fiduciary with respect to the plan, it
becomes subject to the more stringent fiduciary prohibited transaction rules of
section 406(b). When the mutual fund company shares a portion of the fees
249 See PENSION & WELFARE BENErrS ADMIN, supra note 31, Part 3.3.5. These fees are a combination of
fees authorized under section 12(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ('Rule 12b-1 fees") and deferred
contingent sales charges. See id. Rule 12b-1 fees are used by a no-load mutual fund to compensate members
of the fund's marketing and distribution network in lieu of the traditional sales commission. Seeid. Rulel2b-
I fees also may be used to pay for outsourced mutual fund shareholder services. See 1 LEMPKE Er AL., supra
note 126, § 7.05, at 7-25 to -26, 7-31 to -33.
250 For example, the Mutual Fund may be operating under a third-party payment plan, whereby a portion
of the fund's 12b-1 fees are paid to the Service Provider based on the percentage of the fund's assets that are
attributable to the Service Provider's customers-the plan's participants. This and other possible business
arrangements between the Mutual Fund and the Service Provider are described in LEMPKE Er AL., supra note
126, § 7.05, at 7-25 to -33.
251 Examples of such arrangements are described infra Part I1LC.
252 Under federal securities laws, these fees must be disclosed in the mutual fund's prospectus as expense
ratios. The three categories of expense ratios reflect the various types of fees that can be deducted from
mutual fund assets. "Management fees" compensate the fund's investment advisor(s). "Marketing and
distribution fees" ("Rule 12b-1 fees") are used to provide sales commissions to persons in the fund's
distribution network or to compensate third parties who provide recordkeeping services to the fund's
shareholders. "Administrative expenses" are used to pay for other fund shareholder services. See PENSION &
WELFAREBENEFITSADMIN., supra note 31, Part 3.4.3. Mutual fund shareholder services include such things
as answering customer inquiries, maintaining shareholder accounts and records, processing transactions and
providing periodic account balance statements to shareholders. See 1 LEMPKE ET AL., supra note 126, § 7.05,
at 7-31. See generally Matt Murray, Bank Offers Fund Investors Just the Ticket, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1996, at
Cl.
253 Under ERISA section 401(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(1) (1994), the assets contained in the mutual
fund itself are not "plan assets"-only the mutual fund shares are plan assets. See 1 LuMPKE Er AL., supra
note 126, § 25.02, at 25-6. By virtue of ERISA section 3(21)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) (1994), the mutual
fund, the mutual fund company, and the investment advisors who manage the fund's investment portfolio are
not considered to be ERISA fiduciaries solely because ERISA plan assets (the 401(k) plan monies) have been
invested in the mutual fund. See id.
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deducted from the assets of Mutual Fund B with the Service Provider, this
payment is now a prohibited "kickback" transaction under section 406(b)(3)2 5 4
even if the fee payment is fully disclosed to and approved by the plan's
sponsoring employer.255  When it renders investment advice to plan
participants, the Service Provider's potential for transgressing the section
406(b) fiduciary prohibited transaction rules can arise in more subtle ways.
Suppose the plan's Service Provider is the mutual fund company itself (or its
affiliate). The plan offers three of the Service Provider's own no load mutual
funds-a money market fund, a bond fund, and an equity fund-as investment
options to the plan participants. The fees generated by the equity fund and
deducted out of mutual fund assets are more than the fees generated by the
256money market fund. Assume the Service Provider advises the plan
participant to invest in the equity fund. Even if this investment advice is in the
best interest of the plan participant, and is consistent with the Service
Provider's fiduciary duties under section 404(a), 2 7 the mere potential for a
higher fee causes the Service Provider to engage in a "self-dealing" fiduciary
prohibited transaction under section 406(b)(1).
When ERISA's fiduciary prohibited transaction rules were first adopted in
1974, they caused similar problems for the service providers who provided
investment advice to defined benefit plans. As a result, securities brokerage
firms, followed by mutual fund companies, and then finally by third party
investment advisors, requested and received administrative relief from the
Department of Labor in the form of class exemptions from ERISA's fiduciary
prohibited transaction rules.259 It is uncertain whether these class exemptions
254 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
255 See 29 C.F.R. §2550.408b-2(e)(1), (f) Ex. (2) (1999).
256 This is typically the case, because it takes more effort to manage a portfolio of equities than to manage
a portfolio of short-term U.S. Treasury bonds. For specific examples, the reader is referred to the facts
described in the individual prohibited transaction exemptions for investment advice programs. See infra Part
uI.C.
257 See supra Part II.B.
258 See Kievan, supra note 228, at 563-64.
259 Prior to the enactment of ERISA, broker-dealers routinely rendered investment advice to employers
who sponsored defined benefit plans, and received sales commissions on the plan's securities transactions. See
40 Fed. Reg. 5,201 (1975) (Interim Exemption). After the enactment of ERISA, this business practice became
a prohibited fiduciary self-dealing transaction under Section 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1994). Almost
immediately after ERISA became effective, the Department of Labor granted administrative relief to the
securities industry from the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules pursuant to Prohibited Transaction
Exemption 75-1 ("PTE 75-1"). See 40 Fed. Reg. at 5,201-02 (1975) (Interim Exemption); 40 Fed. Reg.
50,845-50 (1975) (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 75-1); DONALD J. MEYERS & MICHAEL B. RICHMAN,
ERISA CLASS EXEMPTIONS 1-2 (2d ed. 1996). PTE 75-1 gave only temporary relief to broker-dealers who
also acted as fiduciary investment advisors to plans. See id. at I. The Department of Labor eventually granted
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are available to fiduciaries who render investment advice to plan participants
under the individual responsibility model, for primarily two reasons. First, a
common condition for relief under the administrative exemptions is that the
investment transactions and all fees paid to the plan's fiduciary investment
advisor must be disclosed to and approved by an "independent fiduciary" for
the plan.260 When the Department of Labor developed the terms and
conditions of these administrative exemptions, this independent fiduciary was
assumed to be the employer who sponsored the defined benefit plan.?61 It is
unclear whether the plan participants can each act as their own independent
fiduciaries for purposes of satisfying this condition, particularly when the
404(c) Regulations specifically provide that the plan participants are not
fiduciaries.762 Second, the class exemption may, as a condition for exemptive
relief, prohibit the fiduciary from receiving "sales commissions" resulting from
plan investments. 263 The Department of Labor's position is that so-called Rule
12b-1 fees" paid by no-load mutual funds are "sales commissions," and
permanent exemptive relief to broker-dealers who render fiduciary investment advice and who receive a
commission from securities transactions involving plan assets in Prohibited Transaction Exemption 86-128.
See Class Exemption for Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers, 51
Fed. Reg. 41,686 (1986); MvYERS & RICHMAN, supra, at 1-2, 763-64.
Shortly after the issuance of PTE 75-1, representatives of principal underwriters for mutual fund
companies, along with pension consultants and the insurance industry, requested and received Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 77-9 ("PTE 77-9"), which eventually became Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24
("PTE 84-24"). See 49 Fed. Reg. 13,208-13 (1984); 42 Fed. Reg. 32,395-401 (1977); 41 Fed. Reg. 56,760-62
(1976). The mutual fund industry requested this administrative exemption because ERISA's fiduciary
prohibited transaction rules prevented the underwriters from receiving sales commissions or "loads" on the
sale of mutual fund shares. See 41 Fed. Reg. at 56,761-62; MEYERS & RICHMAN, supra, at 140-41. In
addition, the Department of Labor issued Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-4 (' PTE 77-4"), which allows
service providers to act in the dual role of investment advisor to both the plan's sponsoring employer and the
mutual funds in which the plan's assets are invested. See 42 Fed. Reg. 18,732 (1977); MEYERS & RICHMAN,
supra, at 92-100.
260 See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24, Section V(C), 49 Fed. Reg. at 13,212 (1984); Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 77-4, Section i1(d)-(e), 42 Fed. Reg. at 18,733 (1977); MEYERS & RICHMAN, supra
note 259, at 92-93, 140-41,701-02.
261 See sources cited supra notes 259-60.
262 The Department of Labor had indicated in a 1980 advisory opinion letter that, for purposes of
interpreting the independent fiduciary approval requirement under PIE 77-9 (now PTE 84-24), plan
participants could be substituted for the necessary "independent fiduciary." See PWBA Op. Ltr. 80-30A, 1980
WL 8932 (May 21, 1980). The 404(c) Regulations take the position that plan participants in 404(c) plans are
not fiduciaries. See 29 C.F.R. §2550.404c-l(d)(1) (1999). Adding to the confusion, the Department of Labor
has indicated in a series of advisory opinion letters issued in 1994 and 1995 that, if the plan is properly
designed, the plan participant can be substituted for the employer as the plan's "named fiduciary" for purposes
of directing a trustee under section 403(a)(1) of ERISA. See Colleen E. Medill, The Law of Directed Trustees
Under ERISA: A Proposed Blueprint for the Federal Courts, 61 Mo. L. REv. 825, 830-31 (1996).
263 See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-4, Section II(a), 42 Fed. Reg. at 18,733.
264 See supra note 252.
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therefore the receipt of these fees violates the terms and conditions for
administrative relief from the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules.
265
To date, the Department of Labor has not issued a class exemption from the
fiduciary prohibited transaction rules designed to allow service providers to
provide investment advice to plan participants who direct the investment of
their retirement plan assets. The Department of Labor has, however, granted
several individual exemptions that allow individual service providers to offer
investment advice to plan participants. 266 These individual exemptions, dis-
cussed in Part III.C., form the framework for a much-needed class exemption
designed specifically for today's individual responsibility model.
E. Lack of Participant Education and Investment Advice as a Product of
Department of Labor Policy
Prior to the issuance of the 404(c) Regulations, employers were reluctant to
allow plan participants to direct the investment of their 401(k) plan accounts
because of the employer's potential fiduciary liability for investment losses.
The 404(c) Regulations eliminated this investment liability concern, thereby
encouraging employers to allow participants to direct the investment of their
retirement savings. The 404(c) Regulations do not, however, require the
employer to provide plan participants with retirement savings educational
materials or investment advice.267
The Department of Labor's broad definition of a "fiduciary investment
advisor' 268 provides a legal incentive, for both employers and plan service
providers, strictly to limit the information and assistance provided to
participants to the types of information and disclosures required by the 404(c)
Regulations. These required disclosures and information are directed at the
level of a financially sophisticated investor. If additional materials or personal
265 See PWBA Op. Ltr. 93-13A, n.4, 1993 WL 188472 (Apr. 27, 1993) (Rule 12b-1 fees considered sales
commissions); PWBA Op. Utr. 93-12A, n.4, 1993 WL 188471 (Apr. 27, 1993) (same). Further legal
uncertainly arises because PTE 77-4 does permit the plan's fiduciary investment advisor to receive administra-
tive fees from the mutual fund (excluding Rule 12b-1 fees) for shareholder services other than investment
advisory services to the fund ("secondary services"), provided that these fees for secondary services are
disclosed to the plan's independent fiduciary. See PWBA Op. Ltr. 93-12A, text accompanying nn.3 & 4, 1993
WL 188471. The determination of whether a fee paid at the mutual fund level is for investment advisory
services to the fund or for secondary services to mutual fund shareholders involves an inherently uncertain
case by case analysis. See PWBA Op. Itr. 93-13A, n.3, 1993 WL 188472.
266 See infra Part III.C.
267 See supra Part I.C.
268 See supra Part HI.A.
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assistance is provided to plan participants, both the employer and the plan
service provider have strong legal and financial incentives to keep the
materials or personal assistance at a level that is general rather than
personalized to the participant's individual needs and circumstances. Why?
Because general materials and assistance minimize the risk that the materials
or assistance will be interpreted to be the fiduciary rendering of individualized
"investment advice" to plan participants. 269 By avoiding fiduciary investment
advisor status, the service provider supplying the materials or assistance to
plan participants avoids potential fiduciary liability, and the employer avoids
potential co-fiduciary liability.
270
The service provider also may achieve a second, financially more
significant, benefit by avoiding fiduciary status as an investment advisor. By
avoiding fiduciary status, the service provider is subject only to the prohibited
transaction rules of section 406(a), not to the more stringent fiduciary
prohibited transaction rules of section 406(b).271  Therefore, the service
provider can continue to receive a reasonable fee or commission, paid out of
plan assets through a deduction from the participant's account, for non-
fiduciary services provided to the plan.272  More importantly, the service
provider can continue to receive fees, paid at the mutual fund level, pursuant to
various business arrangements with the plan's mutual fund investment
options.273
In contrast, compare the situation of a non-fiduciary service provider with
that of a service provider who renders fiduciary investment advice to plan
participants. The fiduciary service provider is subject to potential liability
under ERISA for any breach of its fiduciary duties under section 404(a).274
More importantly, the fiduciary service provider becomes subject to the
fiduciary prohibited transaction rules of section 406(b).275 Because there are
no clearly applicable class exemptions, these fiduciary prohibited transaction
rules prohibit the service providers from receiving fees deducted at the mutual
fund level out of mutual fund assets. 6  Consequently, from the service
269 See supra Part ll.A.
270 See supra Part ll.B.
271 See supra Part H.D.
272 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
274 See supra Part l.B. This is not necessarily a significant deterrent. See infra notes 433-37 and
accompanying text.
275 See supra Part lI.D.
276 See supra Part II.D.
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provider's perspective, there is substantially less liability and substantially
more in the way of potential revenue to be gained by not providing investment
advice to plan participants, and thereby remaining a non-fiduciary.
From the employer's perspective, having a service provider render
investment advice to plan participants subjects the employer to potential co-
fiduciary liability.277 To minimize such liability and to fulfill its own fiduciary
duty of care, the employer must prudently monitor the conduct of the fiduciary
investment advisor. 27 Such supervisory responsibility is contrary to the appeal
of the individual responsibility model for many employers, who desire fewer
administrative tasks.279 Few employers have the expertise to evaluate whether
a professional investment advisor is acting prudently in advising the plan
participants. Although the employer who sponsors a participant-directed plan
still retains a fiduciary duty to monitor the plan's non-fiduciary service
providers, this fiduciary duty is much more narrow in scope, and presents a
less onerous and less costly administrative task, when compared with engaging
and monitoring the services of a fiduciary investment advisor for plan partici-
pants.
If, despite these potential liability concerns, the employer desires to offer
investment advice to plan participants, the employer could hire a professional
who is independent of the plan's mutual fund investment options to provide
investment advice to plan participants. The fee paid to this professional
investment advisor cannot be paid out of plan assets due to the prohibition on
fiduciary self-dealing. 28  This option is unattractive to many employers who
have adopted the individual responsibility model. Employers would prefer to
have plan administrative and servicing fees paid out of plan assets through
deductions from each participant's individual account, thereby reducing the
employer's cost of administering the plan.28
1
In conclusion, the lack of meaningful decision-making assistance in the
form of educational assistance and individualized investment advice to plan
participants is the direct product of Department of Labor administrative policy.
Despite the emergence of the participant-directed 401(k) plan and evidence of
questionable decision-making behavior by many plan participants, the Depart-
277 See supra Part I.B.
278 See sources cited supra note 176.
279 See sources cited supra note 24.
280 See supra Part l.D.
281 See sources cited supra note 24. The recent trend is for employers to shift plan administrative
expenses to plan participants. See PENSION & WE.FARE BENEFrrs ADMN., supra note 31, Part 3.6.
[Vol. 49
CONFORMING ERISA POLICY TO REALITY
ment has continued to adhere to interpretations of ERISA's fiduciary
prohibited transaction provisions that were formulated for defined benefit
plans. As a result, both employers and plan service providers are deterred from
doing anything more than the bare minimum required by the 404(c)
Regulations. Meanwhile, the plan participants, whom ERISA was designed to
protect, are left with the responsibility of individually accumulating adequate
savings for retirement, without the benefit of professional investment advice.
Recognizing the perils of the individual responsibility model for plan
participants, Congress and the Department of Labor have taken measures to
encourage employers and plan service providers to provide more retirement
savings investment education to plan participants. These recent initiatives are
discussed in Part III, and critiqued in Part IV.
III. RECENT INITIATIVES TO ENCOURAGE PARTICIPANT
INVESTMENT EDUCATION
A. The Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997
In November of 1997, Congress enacted the Savings Are Vital to
Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997 (the "SAVER Act").282 Congress found
that the impending retirement of the baby boom generation "will severely
strain our already overburdened entitlement system, necessitating increased
reliance on pension and other personal savings," and that "far too many
Americans-particularly the young-are either unaware of, or without the
knowledge and resources necessary to take advantage of, the extensive benefits
offered by our retirement savings system.' 283 The purpose of the SAVER Act
is to promote public education and awareness of the need for personal
retirement savings. 
2N
The SAVER Act amends ERISA by adding two new sections. First, new
ERISA section 516 requires the Department of Labor to establish and maintain
an ongoing progam of public outreach designed to promote retirement savings
by the public. Second, new ERISA section 517 requires the President to
282 Savings Are Vital To Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 2139-45 (amending 29 U.S.C.
§ 1146(a)).
283 See id. § 2.
24 See H.R. REP. No. 105-104, at 1 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2768, 2770.
285 See Ill Stat. 2139 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1146(a)). The SAVER Act requires the Department of
Labor to include specific types of retirement savings-related information as part of its outreach program, and
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convene three National Summits on Retirement Savings in 1998, 2001, and
2862005. The purpose of these National Summits is to increase public aware-
ness and knowledge of the value of personal savings for retirement, to identify
barriers to increased retirement savings, and to develop legislative and policy
recommendations to promote retirement savings.
287
Although the SAVER Act sets forth ambitious goals for increasing
retirement savings through public information, its potential effectiveness is
questionable. As discussed in Part I, studies of the general public's knowledge
of saving and investing for retirement indicate that the groups most at risk for
inadequate retirement savings are low-wage, lower educated workers.288 This
group is also less likely to access or benefit from the Department of Labor's
Internet site. Moreover, merely providing individuals with general information
concerning retirement savings issues has not proven effective in the past in
influencing the choices of plan participants.289  In short, the SAVER Act, at
best, represents a symbolic gesture that is unlikely to effect meaningful change
in the retirement savings habits of many Americans.
290
also requires the Department of Labor to establish a permanent retirement savings information site on the
Internet. See id. (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1146(c)-(d)).
286 See id. § 4(a) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1147(a)). The first of these National Summits was held at the
White House June 4-5, 1998. See Pensions: Officials Announce Dates, Participants in Saver Retirement
Savings Summit, DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 27, 1998, at G-8. News accounts indicate that this first summit
revealed deep divisions among the experts concerning federal retirement policy issues. See Employee
Benefits: Rep. Pomeroy Expresses Disappointment Over Retirement Savings National Summit, DAILY TAX
REP., June 17, 1998, at G-6 (comments by Rep. Earl Pomeroy).
2"7 See 11 Stat. 2139 § 4(a) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1147(c)).
288 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
289 For example, since the taxation rules governing direct rollovers were changed by the Unemployment
Compensation Amendments of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-318, 106 Stat. 290 (codified at scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.), effective in 1993, plan administrators have been required by law to provide the plan participant with a
detailed explanation of the participant's options and an explanation of the adverse tax consequences of failing
to elect the direct rollover option. See I.R.C. § 402(f) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(0-1,
Q&A-1 (as amended in 2000). The Treasury Department has issued a "safe harbor explanation" that plan
administrators may use to satisfy the direct rollover explanation requirement. See I.R.S. Notice 92-48, 1992-2
C.B. 377. Yet the legislative history to the SAVER Act itself notes that "79% of those who did participate [in
401(k) plans] failed to roll over all of their account into either a new plan or an Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) when they changed jobs (thus not only depleting their retirement savings but also incurring a significant
tax penalty)." H.R. REP. No. 105-104, at 7, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2770.
290 Retirement Policy: House Passes SAVER Act; White House Voices Opposition, Pens. & Bens. Daily
(BNA), at d2 (May 22, 1997).
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B. Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 Concerning Participant Investment Education
In 1996 the Department of Labor issued Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 because
of a growing concern that many participants lacked sufficient knowledge to
make informed investment decisions.291 Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 encourages
employers to establish retirement savings investment education programs for
plan participants by clarifying the legal distinction between non-fiduciary
participant investment education efforts and the fiduciary rendering of
292investment advice. Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 is structured as a series of four
graduated "safe harbors." 9  Information or materials provided to plan partici-
pants that fall within a safe harbor category are "educational" and not the
fiduciary rendering of investment advice. 4 If the information or materials do
not fall within a safe harbor category, whether the information or materials
constitute the fiduciary rendering of investment advice is determined by a facts
and circumstances analysis based on the Department of Labor's interpretation
of a fiduciary investment advisor.
295
1. Safe Harbors I and 2: Plan Information and General Financial and
Investment Information
The first and most basic of the four safe harbors, plan information, overlaps
to a great extent with the information the employer is required to provide the
participant under ERISA's summary plan description requirements. 296 Under
this safe harbor, the employer or service provider may provide participants
with general information concerning the plan. For example, the information
may explain the benefits of participating in the plan and increasing contri-
butions;297 the disadvantages of withdrawing money prior to retirement 98 or
failing to elect a direct rollover;299 the terms and operation of the plan;a°0 and
the investment options available under the plan.a30 The Department of Labor's
291 See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,586-90 (1996) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1999)).
292 See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(b)-(c). The Department of Labor developed Interpretive
Bulletin 96-1 after an extensive review of the educational materials currently being provided by employers and
service providers to plan participants. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 29,586.
293 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d).
294 See id.
295 See id. § 2509.96-1(d); see also supra Part II.A.
296 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994), with 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d)(1).
297 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d)(1)(i).
298 See id.
299 See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,586, 29,588 (1996).
'0o See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d)(1)(i).
301 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(1)(ii).
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rationale for treating this information as "educational" is that such items are
generic and do not indicate that a particular investment option is appropriate
for certain individuals. 3°2 Therefore, these items do not constitute investment
"advice" or "recommendations" to individual plan participants.
30 3
The second of the four safe harbors, general financial and investment
information, introduces the participant to the concepts used in retirement
planning. This safe harbor allows the participant to receive the equivalent of a
crash course in investment theory. The participant may receive information
explaining the investment concepts of risk and return, diversification, dollar
cost averaging, compounded return, and tax deferred investment. 304  The
materials may describe the historic differences in rates of return between
305different categories of investments (e.g., equities, bonds, or cash). In
addition, the educational materials may explain in general the effects of
inflation, estimating future retirement income needs; determining investment
time horizons; and assessing risk tolerance.306  Again, the Department of
Labor's rationale for treating this information as "educational" is that this
theoretical information has no direct link to the plan's specific investment
options or to the financial circumstances of individual participants.
307
2. Safe Harbors 3 and 4: Asset Allocation Models and Interactive
Investment Materials
The third safe harbor category allows a participant to receive "asset
allocation models."30 8 The Interpretive Bulletin describes asset allocation
models as pie charts, graphs, or case studies that provide sample asset
allocation portfolios for hypothetical individuals with different time horizons
and risk profiles. 309 For example, a set of sample portfolios might be labeled
as the "Young Professional Portfolio," "Growing Family Portfolio," "College
102 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(1)(ii).
303 See id




308 Id. § 2509.96-1(d)(3).
309 See id For a description with examples of the evolution of asset allocation models in today's market
place, see Veenan & McWherter, supra note 91, at 51-53. For a discussion of some of the underlying design
issues involved in creating asset allocation models, see Brian Temoey & A. Foster Higgins, Appropriate Asset
Allocation: What Is It? Investment Option Issues at Retirement, in WHEN WORKERS CALL THE SHOTS, supra
note 18, at 43; Veenan & McWherter, supra note 91, at 53-56.
[Vol. 49
CONFORMING ERISA POLICY TO REALITY
Bound Portfolio," and the "Ready to Retire Portfolio." 310  In theory, asset
allocation models are designed to fit an individual participant "profile"
captured by the label assigned to the sample portfolio.31' One of the criticisms
of asset allocation models is that in reality, these profile labels do not always
fit the unique circumstances of each plan participant.
312
The fourth safe harbor category, interactive investment materials, consists
of the various types of investment tools a participant may use to estimate his
future retirement income and the effect of different investment allocations on
313that income. The materials can be in the form of questionnaires, worksheets,
software, or other similar interactive materials.
314
The Interpretive Bulletin imposes a number of restrictions and require-
ments for asset allocation models and interactive investment materials. The
models and materials must be based on generally accepted investment theories
that take into account the historic returns of various asset categories.315  For
interactive materials, there must be an objective correlation between the
investment allocations generated by the materials and the information and data
supplied by the participant.316
All material facts and assumptions on which an asset allocation model is
317based must accompany the model. A statement must caution participants
that in applying particular models to their individual situations, they should
also consider their other assets, income, and investments.18 Interactive
investment materials must disclose all material facts and assumptions that may
affect the participant's assessment of the different investment allocations319
generated by the materials. The interactive materials must either take into
account the participant's other assets, income, and investments, or state that the
participant should take these items into account.
320
310 See Veenan & McWherter, supra note 91, at 51.
311 See id.
312 See id. Although more sophisticated asset allocation models today have eliminated these labels in
favor of "neutral" labels, such a change in form does not resolve this application problem. See id. at 51-52.
313 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d)(4).
314 See id.
315 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(3)(i); (d)(4)(i).
316 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(4)(i)-(ii).
317 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(3)(ii).
318 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(3)(iv).
319 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(4)(iii).
320 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(4)(v).
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If the asset allocation model or the interactive investment materials identify
specific investment options available under the plan, an additional disclosure
statement is required. Models or materials must state that other investment
alternatives having similar risk and return characteristics may be available
under the plan, and identify where such information may be obtained.32'
However, the model or materials do not have to identify these other investment
alternatives.
322
The Department of Labor's rationale for treating asset allocation models
and interactive investment materials as "educational" is that the disclosures
accompanying the models and material enable participants to assess
independently the relevance and application of particular investment
allocations to their own personal situation. 32  Therefore, the Department of
Labor concluded that these models and materials do not constitute a
"recommendation" of investments to the participant, and thus are not the
fiduciary rendering of "investment advice" under section 3(21)(A)(ii) of
ERISA. 324  In other words, the participant is deemed to be exercising in-
dependent judgment and is not relying on the investment allocation suggested
by the model or materials. This policy applies even if the plan offers only one
mutual fund for each investment category suggested by the models or
materials.
325
3. Applying the Safe Harbors: The Participant's Perspective and the
"Steering Problem"
Although the point is not explicitly discussed in the text of Interpretive
Bulletin 96-1 itself, the Department of Labor commentary accompanying
publication of the final Bulletin indicates that employers and service providers
can "mix and match" the information described in the four safe harbors and the
means of presentation of this information to the plan participants. 326 It is easy
321 See id § 2509.96-1(d)(3)(iii); (d)(4)(iv).
322 See id. § 2509.96-1(d)(3); (d)(4). As originally proposed, Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 would have
required the service provider to identify all investment alternatives under the plan that would satisfy the
investment allocations indicated by the models or materials. The purpose underlying this requirement was to
prevent potential "steering" of plan participants into specific investment options. See 61 Fed. Reg. 29,586,
29,586-57 (1996). In response to comments by service providers, the Department of Labor reduced this
requirement to a disclosure statement. See id. The "steering problem" is explained and discussed infra Part
m.B.3.
323 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d)(3), (d)(4).
324 See id
325 See id
326 See 61 Fed. Reg. at 29,587.
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to envision a scenario using the safe harbors that, from the participant's
perspective, results in the rendering of "personalized" investment advice. To
illustrate, assume the following hypothetical example. A participant receives
general information on estimating his retirement needs and a retirement
planning software program. The participant enters personal data into the
software program, including data on the participant's non-retirement assets,
income, and other investments. A representative of the service provider assists
the participant in using the software program and completing the required data
input.327 Based on the information entered by the participant, the software
program generates an investment allocation plan for the participant. Each
identified investment category is paired with one specific mutual fund
available under the plan. Such a printout might look like this:
YOUR PERSONALIZED INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO
60% Domestic Equities (Service Provider Large Cap Fund)
20% Long-Term Bonds (Service Provider High Grade Bond Fund)
20% International Equities (Service Provider Global Fund).
From the plan participant's perspective, this printout is indistinguishable
from the situation where the participant's insurance agent or stock broker
provides investment advice for the participant's non-ERISA assets.328 Never-
theless, under Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 the participant has received
investment "education," not investment advice.
The example also illustrates the potential for service providers to use safe
harbor asset allocation models or interactive investment materials to "steer"
plan participants into certain funds offered as investment options under the
plan (the "steering problem").329 A financial incentive exists for the service
provider to steer a participant into a particular fund when the fees paid to the
service 3 provider by one mutual fund are greater than the fees paid by other
funds.' To avoid this steering problem, Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, as
originally proposed, would have required the service provider to identify all of
the specific funds offered under the plan that fell within an investment
category.331  Using my previous example as an illustration, under this
requirement the printout could not identify just one mutual fund for each of the
327 The Department of Labor allows such personal assistance. See id
38 It also is indistinguishable from programs, approved by the Department of Labor, that provide
fiduciary investment advice to plan participants. See infra Part II.C.
329 See Interpretive Bulletin 96-1,61 Fed. Reg. at 29,587.
330 See id
331 See supra note 322.
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three investment categories. Instead, the printout would have to identify all
mutual funds available under the plan that could be used to satisfy the
recommended investment of, for example, "60% Domestic Equities." This
requirement was eliminated in the final Bulletin due to objections by plan
service providers. 33  As a result, in my example the investment printout need
state only that "other investment alternatives having similar risk and return
characteristics may be available under the plan," and must identify "where
information on those investment alternatives may be obtained. 333
The steering problem exists as a result of ERISA's failure to regulate non-
fiduciary conduct.334  Under Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, the service provider
who stays within the safe harbors is not a fiduciary with respect to the plan.335
Therefore, the service provider is not subject to the fiduciary duty of loyalty336
and its fees (paid out of mutual fund assets) are not subject to ERISA's
prohibited transaction rules.337 Consequently, when designing its "safe harbor"
investment models and materials the non-fiduciary service provider may act
with its own best interests in mind (identifying the highest fee-generating
mutual fund) rather than solely in the interest of the plan participant
(identifying the lowest fee-generating mutual fund).338 The only legal
constraint imposed by ERISA on such self-serving conduct by the non-
fiduciary service provider is the employer's fiduciary duty to "monitor" the
service provider.
339
The ultimate effect on the participant's retirement savings can be
substantial. The Department of Labor's own study on the issue presents the
following example:
332 See supra note 322.
333 Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 61 Fed. Reg. at 29,586-87; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d)(4)(iv) (1999).
334 See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
335 See supra Part III.B.1, 2.
336 See supra notes 173, 177 and accompanying text.
337 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
338 The design of the service provider's models and materials must still satisfy the criteria for safe harbor
treatment under Interpretive Bulletin 96-1. See supra Part IlI.B.1, 2. Within these parameters, however, the
service provider is free to steer participants to particular mutual funds.
339 See sources cited supra note 176. If the mutual fund fees paid to the service provider are not so
outrageous that they attract the attention of the plan participants or the Department of Labor, the typical
employer is unlikely to notice a steering problem. See DOL Issues Section 401(k) Fee Guide, Continues To
Consider Further Requirements, 25 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1545 (Jul. 6, 1998) (stating that employers are
generally unknowledgeable about fees). The amount of fees paid out of mutual fund assets are, of course,
subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Investment Company Act of
1940. See supra note 226.
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Assume that you are an employee with 35 years until retirement and
a current 401(k) account balance of $25,000. If returns on
investments in your account over the next 35 years average 7 percent
and [mutual fund level] fees and expenses reduce your average
returns by 0.5 percent, your account balance will grow to $227,000 at
retirement, even if there are no further contributions to your account.
If [mutual fund level] fees and expenses are 1.5 percent, however,
your account balance will grow to only $163,000. The 1 percent
difference in fees and expenses would reduce your account balance
at retirement by 28 percent.
340
The steering problem is invidious because employers and plan participants
generally are ignorant of the impact of .mutual fund fees on retirement
savings. 341 It also raises serious policy concerns, particularly when Interpre-
tive Bulletin 96-1 is contrasted with other recent Department of Labor rulings
on individual service provider programs that provide investment advice to plan
participants.342
C. Individual Prohibited Transaction Exemptions for Investment Advice
Programs
The Department of Labor has granted a series of fiduciary prohibited
transaction exemptions to individual service providers.343  An individual
exemption allows the service provider to provide fiduciary investment advice
to plan participants without a violation of ERISA's prohibited transaction
rules.344 This series began with the ground-breaking Shearson-Lehman
Brothers, Inc. ("Shearson Lehman") exemption in 1992.34 More recently, the
Department of Labor granted an individual exemption to a group of related
entities affiliated with the Trust Company of the West.34 6 These rulings oninvestment advice programs for plan participants are important barometers of
340 PENSION & WELFARE BENEFTS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN FEES 2
(1998), available at <http:llwww.dol.gov/dollpwba>.
341 See DOL Issues Fee Guide, supra note 339; PENSION & WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMIN., supra note 31,
Part 3.7.
342 See infra Part IM.C.
343 The criteria for granting individual prohibited transaction exemptions are discussed supra note 239.
344 See supra Part ILD.
345 See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 92-77, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,833 (1992) ("TTE 92-77"). PTE 92-77
was subsequently replaced by Prohibited Transaction Exemption 94-50 when the assets of Shearson Lehman
were sold to Smith Barney so that Smith Barney could continue to operate the program. See Proposed
Exemption, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,680-82 (1994); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 94-95, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,024-27
(1994).
346 See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744 (1997).
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Department of Labor policy, and thus worthy of attention for two reasons.
First, ERISA's statutory criteria for individual prohibited transaction exemp-
tions are the same as those for class prohibited transaction exemptions.
Therefore, a series of exemptions granted to individual service providers may
be used to form the basis for a class prohibited transaction exemption available
to the entire industry.348 Second, a fiduciary prohibited transaction exemption
provides relief only from ERISA's prohibited transaction rules. 349  The
investment advice program in operation still must comply with ERISA's
fiduciary duty requirements. 350 As a result, when the Department of Labor
exempts a program providing investment advice from the prohibited
transaction rules, that program still must be consistent with ERISA's fiduciary
provisions. A close examination of the Trust Company of the West exemption,
however, reveals how the "educational" models and materials permitted under
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 can be inconsistent with ERISA's fiduciary pro-
visions.
1. The Shearson Lehman Exemption and Its Progeny
To understand the significance of the recent Trust Company of the West
exemption, one must begin with the 1992 Shearson Lehman exemption and its
progeny.351 In 1991, Shearson Lehman formed a mutual fund company offer-
ing twelve different mutual funds. A wholly-owned subsidiary of Shearson
Lehman served as investment manager for these mutual funds and received
investment advisory fees from the mutual funds based on a percentage of the
assets invested in each mutual fund. The fees paid by each mutual fund to the
investment advisor varied; the equity funds paid the highest fee, while no fee
was paid by the money market fund.
Shearson Lehman proposed to offer investment advice to participants in
plans that used its mutual funds as investment options. The same Shearson
subsidiary that provided the investment advice also served as investment
advisor to the mutual funds. Thus, a fiduciary self-dealing prohibited
transaction issue arose because the Shearson subsidiary could receive a higher
347 See supra note 239.
348 See supra note 239.
349 See sources cited supra note 240.
350 See sources cited supra note 240.
351 The tems and conditions of the Shearson Lehman exemption described below are taken from
Proposed Exemption, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,514 (1992), and Prohibited Transaction Exemption 92-77, 57 Fed. Reg.
45,833 (1992) ("PTE 92-77").
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fee by "steering" plan participants into the higher-fee-paying equity fund.
Shearson Lehman proposed to eliminate this potential conflict of interest, and
thus eliminate the prohibited transaction, by directly charging the plan
participants a fixed fee (the "participant fee") for investment advice. This
participant fee was reduced by the fees paid by the mutual funds to the
Shearson subsidiary in its capacity as the funds' investment advisor (the
"mutual fund fee"). Under Shearson's proposal, the maximum total amount
the Shearson subsidiary could receive was limited to the amount of the
participant fee. This limitation removed any financial incentive and thus
"solved" the steering problem.
The Department of Labor's approval of the Shearson-Lehman exemption
was a well-publicized event in the ERISA world. Other major players among
352 353an WeU Frgplan service providers-Prudential, Paine Webber, and Wells Fargo
Bank354-- quickly followed suit by seeking and receiving their own individual
exemptions for similar investment advice programs. All of these "progeny"
exemptions were patterned after the Shearson Lehman model of a fixed
participant fee for investment advice, offset by the mutual fund fees paid by
the mutual funds.
355
2. Breaking New Ground: The Trust Company of the West Exemption
From the service provider's perspective, the potential economic
disadvantage of the Shearson Lehman model is its limitation on fees. The
Trust Company of the West proposed a creative solution that removed this
limitation. 356  To solve the steering problem, Trust Company of the West
turned to the "neutral" computer. It proposed to hire an independent expert in
the field of modern portfolio theory to construct asset allocation models using
352 See Proposed Exemptions, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,514 (1993); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 93-59,58
Fed. Reg. 47,920 (1993).
353 See Proposed Exemptions, 61 Fed. Reg. 11,882 (1996); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 96-59,61
Fed. Reg. 40,000 (1996).
354 See Proposed Exemptions, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,150 (1996); Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-12, 62
Fed. Reg. 7,275 (1997).
355 See sources cited supra notes 352-54.
356 The terms and conditions of the Trust Company of the West exemption described below are taken
from Proposed Exemptions, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,433 (1997), and Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60,62 Fed.
Reg. 59,744 (1997). For user-friendly descriptions of the Trust Company of the West exemption, see Fred
Williams, TCW May Advise Participants, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 1, 1997, at 1; Prohibited
Transactions: Trust Company May Collect Feesfor InvestmentAdvice, DOL Says, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA),
at d3 (Oct. 31, 1997).
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the various mutual funds offered by Trust Company of the West.3 57 A second
independent expert in the field of participant investment behavior was hired to
develop, together with the outside financial expert, worksheet materials for the
358participants. Trust Company of the West proposed that the information
elicited by the worksheet for each participant be entered into a computer
program. This computer program was designed by independent programmers,
using parameters provided by independent financial and behavioral experts.
The computer program would then generate an investment portfolio for the
participant using the Trust Company of the West mutual funds.
359
Trust Company of the West proposed to charge no participant fee at all for
its investment advice. The sole compensation for the investment advice to
participants would be the fees paid to Trust Company of the West from its
mutual funds. These fees again varied, with the money market fund paying the
lowest fees and the equity funds paying the highest fees. Thus, the Trust
Company of the West retained the full amount of the mutual fund fees without
any limitation.
360
The Department of Labor approved this computerized solution to the
steering problem and granted the exemption. 361  Approval of the Trust
Company of the West exemption was again well-publicized in the ERISA
world. It immediately raised questions in the minds of many plan service
providers, who publicly wondered how this fiduciary investment advice
program differed from the "educational" programs made possible under
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1.363 The Department of Labor initially responded by
downplaying the significance of the exemption as just another of the Shearson
357 See Fred Williams, Ibbotson to Build TCW Advisory Program, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 20,
1998, at 28; sources cited supra note 356.
358 See sources cited supra note 356.
359 Under Trust Company of the West's proposal, the "neutrality" of the financial and behavioral experts
responsible for designing this system was assured because their compensation would be paid directly by Trust
Company of the West and would be unrelated to the investment decisions made by the plan participants. See
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60, 62 Fed. Reg. at 59,748-49.
360 As a marketing strategy, the Trust Company of the West proposal was brilliant. The participants never
see a separate charge for investment advice-to them, the advice looks 'Tree." In reality, of course, the
participants still pay. See supra note 340 and accompanying text (DOL study example).
361 See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744 (1997).
362 See Advice For Sale, PLAN SPoNsOR, Dec.-Jan. 1998, at 55; Labor Department Permits TCW to Give
401(K) Advice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1997, at A10; Prohibited Transactions: Trust Company May Collect
Feesfor Investment Advice, DOL Says, 24 Pen. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2436 (Nov. 3, 1997).
363 See Christine Williamson, 401(k) Advice Field Gets More Crowded, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, June
15, 1998, at 1.
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Lehman progeny.364  Later, the Department apparently realized what the
service providers had seen immediately-it was possible to use the safe
harbors of Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 to construct a "nonfiduciary" program of
investment "education" that was functionally indistinguishable from the
fiduciary investment advice program pioneered by the Trust Company of the
West.365 To counteract this possibility, the Department of Labor cautioned
employers that their service providers should first obtain afiduciary prohibited
transaction exemption from the Department of Labor before offering a
program of investment "education" patterned after the Trust Company of the
West model.366 The implication, of course, was that an investment "education"
program designed to take advantage of the safe harbors of Interpretive Bulletin
96-1 could constitute fiduciary investment advice. As a result, rather than
clarifying the legal definition of a fiduciary investment advisor, the
Department of Labor appears only to have added to the confusion.
There are only two differences between the Trust Company of the West
program and an investment "education" program using asset allocation models
and interactive investment materials under safe harbors 3 and 4 of the Bulletin.
The first difference is that the fiduciary investment advice given under the
Trust Company of the West program is generated by a computer program
designed by outside independent experts. In contrast, the "educational"
materials of safe harbors 3 and 4 are designed by the service provider.367 This
distinction is invisible to the plan participant. It also allows in-house experts to
design investment materials and programs that will "steer" participants into
high fee-generating investments. The second difference is that under
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, if the education materials "identify" a specific
mutual fund, the participant must receive a disclosure/disclaimer that "other
investment alternatives having similar risk and return characteristics may be
available under the plan and identifying where information on those
alternatives may be obtained. ' 368  Such boilerplate is unlikely to put the
average plan participant on notice that he has received investment "education,"
364 See Trust Company May Collect Fees, supra note 362.
365 See Fred Williams, Fidelity Isn't Offering Advice, But... Participants to Get "Personalized" Ideas,
PENSIONS & INvEmENTS, Dec. 8, 1997, at 3.
366 See Williamson, supra note 363. Fidelity's proposed investment education software program provides
an example of an "educational" program that is similar, if not identical, to the Trust Company of the West's
fiduciary investment advice program. See Williams, supra note 365.
367 Compare Prohibited Transaction Exemption 97-60, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,744, 59,746 (1997), with 29
C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1999).
368 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.96-1 (d)(3)(iii), (d)(4)(iv).
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not investment advice, and should independently evaluate the suggested
investments.
In light of this functional equivalence, one must wonder why Trust
Company of the West continued to pursue to completion its prohibited
transaction exemption request after the Department of Labor issued Interpre-
tive Bulletin 96-1. Trust Company of the West was concerned that the
Department of Labor would consider its program to be investment advice.
369
The Department of Labor's apparent acquiescence is well worth pondering.
By going forward with its exemption request after Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
was issued, Trust Company of the West conceded that its program provided
investment advice to plan participants. Conceding fiduciary status creates
obvious disadvantages for Trust Company of the West that would not exist if
its program qualified as investment education under Interpretive Bulletin 96-1.
Trust Company of the West opened itself up to potential liability for breach of
its fiduciary duties under ERISA. It also incurred the additional expenses
associated with maintaining its expert-generated computerized investment
advice program.
Compare this situation with the position of Trust Company of the West if
its program were merely investment education under Interpretive Bulletin 96-
1. As a non-fiduciary education provider, Trust Company of the West would
have no potential fiduciary liability under ERISA. Any claims of potential
liability under state law would be preempted by ERISA. Effectively, Trust
Company of the West would be immune from liability for its investment
educational services. And it could develop its own educational materials "in-
house" without the paid assistance of outside experts.
Given the disadvantages of conceding fiduciary status, one must speculate
that either Trust Company of the West acted out of an abundance of caution, or
the Department of Labor refused to provide sufficient assurance to Trust
Company of the West that its program fell within the safe harbor parameters of
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1. The Department of Labor's subsequent public
comments made after the Trust Company of the West exemption was approved
indicate that it was the latter concern that led Trust Company of the West to go
forward with its exemption request. 37  As a result, the legal line between
investment education and investment advice remains a murky one.
369 See Proposed Exemptions, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,433, 41,439 n.15 (1997).
370 See Williamson, supra note 363.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT POLICY APPROACH TO THE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILrrY MODEL
A fundamental policy tension lies at the heart of ERISA's statutory
scheme. ERISA involves a delicate balancing of two core legislative ob-
jectives.371 On the one hand, Congress wanted to design a system of federal
law that would be protective of plan participants and ensure the security of
372their retirement benefits. On the other hand, Congress retained the existing
system of voluntarily sponsored retirement plans by private parties, and thus
recognized that the system as a whole could not be made "so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from
offering [employee] benefit plans in the first place." 373 I argue in this Part that
the Department of Labor's current policy approach to the individual
responsibility model is contrary to both of these legislative objectives.
A. Should Federal Policy Assume That All Participants Are Informed
Decision-Makers?
The most striking feature of the 404(c) Regulations is their treatment of
plan participants as a monolithic group of knowledgeable and informed
decision-makers. The empirical evidence indicates that participants vary in
their level of financial and investment knowledge. They also vary in their
ability to apply the sophisticated investment concepts required for investment
decision-making under the individual responsibility model.
A monolithic approach could be justified if it assumed that all plan
participants needed substantial assistance, starting with the most basic
educational information relating to retirement planning and investment
decisions. The 404(c) Regulations do not require that basic educational
information be provided to plan participants. Rather, the 404(c) Regulations'
informational requirements begin at the level of a financially sophisticated plan
participant who, for example, can analyze a securities prospectus. 374  The
371 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,497 (1996); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,262-63
(1993); In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420,434 (3d Cir. 1996).372 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); H.R. RP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639,4639; S. REP. No. 93-127, at 1-2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838.
373 Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 497; see also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4639 (stating that "the committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of... retirement
plans").
374 See supra Part I.C. At least one former commissioner of the federal Securities and Exchange
Commission has stated publicly that plan participants in section 404(c) plans are not well-served by full
20001
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
404(c) Regulations compound the decision-making burden placed on
financially illiterate participants by providing that the employer has no
obligation to provide investment advice. All plan participants are presumed
capable of making prudent investment decisions once they are given the
required disclosure information. A blizzard of information, much of it
incomprehensible to the plan participant, relieves the employer of its fiduciary
duty to ensure that plan assets are prudently diversified.
This assumption of participant investment competence becomes even more
transparent when the plan offers employer securities as an investment
option.375 Investing retirement assets in the financial future of the employer is
a high risk strategy that places the employee in a position of "double
jeopardy," at risk of losing both his job and his retirement savings.17  Yet the
404(c) Regulations allow the plan to offer employer securities as an investment
option.377 Significantly, the 404(c) Regulations do not impose any limitation
on the percentage of the participant's plan assets that may be invested in
employer securities, 37 8 despite empirical evidence indicating that some plan
participants choose to concentrate the investment of their retirement savings in
employer securities.
379
In the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,380 Congress recognized and partially
responded to the risks posed by concentrating the investment of retirement plan
assets in employer securities. The Act amends ERISA so that employers are
prohibited from investing more than 10% of participant 401(k) plan salary
deferrals in employer securities. 38  In contrast, the 404(c) Regulations allow
prospectuses and proposed that a shorter, more "user-friendly" prospectus be developed. See WHEN WORKERS
CALL THE SHOTS, supra note 18, at 98-99 (statement of former Commissioner Richard Roberts).
375 Reported data on the prominence of 401(k) plans offering employer securities as an investment option
are conflicting. Compare U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: EXTENT OF PLANS'
INvESTmENTS IN EMPLOYFR SECURITiES AND REAL PROPERTY (1997) (reporting that based on 1993 Form 5500
data, only 2,449 of approximately 160,000 401(k) plans owned employer securities or real property), with
Stabile, supra note 19, at 64 n.10, 67 n.22.
376 See Stabile, supra note 19, at 78-85; Daniel Kadlec, Spread Your Bets, TsME, Feb. 1, 1999, at 72;
supra note 109 and accompanying text.
377 See sources cited supra note 200 and accompanying text.
378 See sources cited supra note 200 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 110-11, 117, 121-22 and accompanying text.
380 Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1524, 111 Stat. 1071 (1997) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(2)).
381 See id. This amendment was prompted by the Color Tile incident. See supra note 118.
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the plan participant to invest all of his retirement savings in employer
securities 382-the retirement equivalent of "caveat retiree."
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 continues the Department of Labor's "one size
fits all" policy approach to the individual responsibility model. Safe harbors 1
and 2 encourage employers to provide basic educational information to
participants. ERISA's summary plan description requirements already
required the employer to provide much of this "safe harbor" information to
plan participants.383 For information not already required, such as the generic
investment information of safe harbor category 2, the Department of Labor's
own 1975 regulation defining investment advice left little doubt that such
general investment information was not fiduciary investment advice.384 Thus,
safe harbors 1 and 2 appear merely to codify, as a symbolic effort, pre-existing
Department of Labor policy.
The area of true legal ambiguity addressed by Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
concerns the asset allocation models and the interactive investment materials
of safe harbors 3 and 4. The Department of Labor's justification for deeming
these items "educational" is that if the requisite disclosure requirements are
satisfied, all participants will be able to assess the relevance of the models and
materials for their individual circumstances and apply them accordingly. Thus,
the Department of Labor rationalizes, participants will not "rely" on the
models and materials when making investment decisions. This rationale
presumes that every participant has the knowledge and ability to evaluate the
facts and assumptions that underlie the models and materials. This rationale is
inconsistent with the empirical evidence. It is simply wrong to think that
participants are not relying on the investment allocations and specific mutual
funds suggested by these models and materials. Participants must rely on these
materials; they are not investment experts. They lack the requisite independent
expertise to evaluate the key assumptions imbedded in the models and
materials, such as "retirement ages, life expectancies, income levels, financial
resources, replacement income ratios, inflation rates, and investment rates of
return." 385 This incongruity between policy and reality is highlighted by the
382 See sources cited supra note 199-200. Professor Stabile has proposed that the 10% limitation on
investment in employer securities should be applied without regard to whether it is the employer or the
participant who makes the investment decision. Stabile, supra note 19, at 88.
383 See 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1994).
384 See supra Part ILA.




absence of a requirement that the basic information of safe harbors 1 and 2 be
provided to participants if the participants are receiving the asset allocation
models of safe harbor 3 or the interactive investment materials of safe harbor
4. Ironically, providing this basic information might enable more participants
to perform the sophisticated independent evaluation presumed by the
Department of Labor.
B. Interpretive Bulletin 96-1: Encouragement or Burden to the Employer?
The Department of Labor issued Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 to encourage
investment education for plan participants. 386 When Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
is evaluated in the context of the employer's fiduciary responsibilities and the
404(c) Regulations, it becomes apparent that the burden imposed on the
employer is a heavy one. The result is that participants are likely to receive
less assistance in making investment decisions.
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 imposes on the employer a duty prudently to
select and monitor the activities of any education provider or investment
advisor. 387  This monitoring duty becomes increasingly difficult for the
employer as the education provider advances up the Interpretive Bulletin's safe
harbor levels. At the safe harbor level 1 (plan information) the employer easily
can ascertain that the educational materials are accurate in their description of
the employer's own plan and its basic features, benefits, and investment
options. Safe harbor level 2, educational information on general financial and
investment concepts, is more difficult for the typical employer to monitor for
accuracy. At safe harbor levels 3 and 4, asset allocation models and interactive
investment materials, the employer is called to monitor whether the models
and materials are based on "generally accepted investment theories" and
disclose all underlying "material facts and assumptions." Ascertaining that
these conditions have been satisfied is beyond the expertise of many, if not
most, employers.
388
386 Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,586 (1996) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 2509.96-1).
387 See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(e). This duty is part of the employer's fiduciary duty of care. See sources
cited supra note 176.
388 See ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 176, at 4.
Many of the problems with respect to service providers arise because the responsible plan
fiduciary either does not understand his role and responsibility in the selection and monitoring of
service providers or exercises poor judgment because he does not have experience or an
appropriate source of information concerning legal requirements and industry practices.
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If the educational provider has failed to satisfy the criteria for safe harbor
protection under Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, the employer faces significant
potential liability under ERISA. Two scenarios are possible. The education
provider may, under the Department of Labor's 1975 regulation defining
"investment advice, ' 389 remain a non-fiduciary. Alternatively, under this
regulation the "education" provider may, in fact, be a fiduciary investment
advisor. This determination of non-fiduciary or fiduciary status will turn on a
facts and circumstances analysis.3  The adverse consequences for the
employer under each possibility are analyzed below.
First, assume that the education provider has not acted as a fiduciary, but
has provided inaccurate or misleading information to the participants. The
employer becomes potentially liable for a breach of its duty to monitor the
education provider.391  It is at this point that Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
intersects with the 404(c) Regulations and the employer enters a legal
quagmire. Does an education provider's failure to comply with the conditions
for safe harbor status under Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 eliminate the employer's
protection from fiduciary liability for participant-directed investment
transaction losses under ERISA section 404(c)? The answer to this issue is
uncertain. The rationale underlying the employer's section 404(c) exemption
from fiduciary liability for participant-directed investment losses is that the
directing participant has exercised informed independent control. What if the
participant's investment decision has been "tainted" by misleading educational
information? Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 states that:
In the context of an ERISA Section 404(c) plan, neither the
designation of a person to provide education nor the designation of a
fiduciary to provide investment advice to participants ... would, in
itself, give rise to fiduciary liability for loss ... that is the direct and
necessary- result of a participant's ... exercise of independent
control.
392
In a footnote to Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, however, the Department of
Labor has indicated that providing information to plan participants "may affect
a participant's ... ability to exercise independent control over the assets in his
Id.; see also sources cited supra note 151 (maintaining that modem portfolio theory is notoriously difficult to
comprehend, even among experts in the field).
389 See supra Part ILA.
390 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
391 See sources cited supra note 176 and accompanying text.
392 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(e) (emphasis added).
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or her account for purposes of relief from fiduciary liability under ERISA
Section 404(c)" but stated that such circumstances were "beyond the scope of
this interpretive bulletin" and that "no inferences should be drawn regarding
such issues."
393
Translated into plain English, Department of Labor policy on this issue is
to evaluate the employer's liability for investment losses on a case by case
basis. In times of a progressively rising stock market, the inherent uncertainty
of a case by case analysis is no more than a point of theoretical debate for
academics. Since the final 404(c) Regulations were issued in 1992, the stock
market generally has experienced a steady upward climb.394  Consequently,
participant-directed investments have tended to perform well, leaving little
financial incentive for participants in section 404(c) plans to challenge an
employer's degree of compliance with the 404(c) Regulations in the courts.3 95
In times of stock market volatility or even decline, however, the prospect of
significant participant investment losses in participant-directed plans becomes
a very real concern for employers. A volatile or declining stock market
heightens the potential financial consequences of an employer's breach of its
duty to monitor the investment education materials provided to plan partici-
pants. When these economic circumstances occur, suits against employers for
participant-directed investment losses are more likely to arise.3 1 Ironically,
the truly culpable party-the education provider responsible for providing the
misleading investment information-will not be liable under either ERISA or
state law for its negligent conduct.
397
393 id. at n.2.
394 See Stephen E. Frank et al., Heard on the Street: Don't Worry Unless They Start Leaping, WAL. ST.
J., Aug. 28,1997, at Al; Suzanne McGee, Stocks Maintained Rally Despite Volatility, But Bulls Turn Cautious
About Earnings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1997, at R2; Robert O'Brien, Abreast of the Market: Late Rally Lifts
Stocks to Records, As Chase and Banking Sector Soar, WALL ST. J., March 18, 1998, at C2.
39S One noteworthy exception is the ongoing litigation by participants in the Unysis Corporation plan who
had the misfortune of selecting Executive Life Insurance Company ("Executive Life") guaranteed investment
contracts as their investment option. When Executive Life was declared insolvent, these plan participants filed
suit against the employer, Unysis, for breach of its fiduciary duties under section 404(a)(1) and sought to
recover their investment losses. Unysis's defense was that it was exempt from such liability pursuant to
section 404(c). The Department of Labor's final 404(c) Regulations were not at issue in the case because the
employer's disclosures and Executive Life's insolvency predated the Regulations' adoption. Nevertheless, the
court's ultimate disposition of the case may have significant implications for enforcement of the 404(c)
Regulations. See generally In re Unysis Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996).
396 The participants' claim would be that the employer breached its fiduciary duties of care and prudent
diversification. See supra Part II.B. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over breach of fiduciary
duty claims. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1994).
397 This result occurs because the education provider is not a fiduciary. See supra notes 153-57 and
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Now assume the other possibility-that the employer's "education"
provider actually has rendered fiduciary investment advice. Interpretive
Bulletin 96-1 provides that the employer is subject to co-fiduciary liability for
the acts of its fiduciary investment advisor.3" The Interpretive Bulletin
appears to contemplate a situation where the employer has consciously
engaged the services of a fiduciary investment advisor.399 Under my scenario,
the employer (mistakenly) thought it was hiring an "education" provider to
give participants asset allocation models and interactive investment materials.
In this situation the employer has unknowingly hired a co-fiduciary and
assumed co-fiduciary responsibilities and potential liability. °00 How can the
employer ascertain whether its service provider is a non-fiduciary (providing
investment education) or a fiduciary (providing investment advice)? The
employer is supposed to be guided and thus reassured by the safe harbor
criteria of Interpretive Bulletin 96-1. Ascertaining whether the service
provider's asset allocation models or interactive investment materials satisfy
these criteria is beyond the expertise of most employers. They, like the plan
participants, simply will rely on the representations of the service provider that
the safe harbor criteria for non-fiduciary status have been satisfied.
Such reliance is at the employer's peril. Mere representations are not
determinative of the service provider's fiduciary status with respect to the plan
or of its co-fiduciary status with respect to the employer.
401
There is a straightforward way for the employer to avoid this potential legal
quagmire. The employer can strictly limit the information provided to plan
participants to the minimum disclosure requirements of the 404(c)
Regulations-exactly the opposite result of what Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 was
intended to accomplish.
accompanying text.
398 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(e) (1999).
399 Id
400 See supra Parts ILA, B.
401 See sources cited supra notes 153, 174, 181. In a co-fiduciary situation, it is unclear whether an
employer's reliance on service provider representations is a valid defense to a claim of co-fiduciary liability. It
is clear that the fiduciary may rely upon information, data, statistics or analysis furnished by persons
performing non-fiduciary ministerial functions for the plan, assuming the fiduciary has exercised prudence in
the selection of such persons. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-11 (1999).
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C. Erosion of ERISA 's Statutory Protections for Plan Participants
Is current Department of Labor policy consistent with and supportive of
ERISA's statutory protections for plan participants? I argue in this subpart
that, to the contrary, the Department of Labor's approach erodes ERISA's
statutory disclosure requirements and its fiduciary-based structure protecting
plan participants.
Under the individual responsibility model, the contribution and investment
decisions of the plan participant determine the "security" of his retirement
benefit. Although the Department of Labor issued Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 to
encourage more investment education for plan participants, the 404(c)
Regulations undermine the Bulletin's beneficial impact. The only decision-
making assistance to plan participants required under the 404(c) Regulations is
financial information that many plan participants cannot understand or use.4 2
The financial disclosures required under the 404(c) Regulations are incon-
sistent with one of ERISA's fundamental mechanisms for protecting plan
participants-the participant disclosure requirements.40 3 One of the important,
but often overlooked, functions of the disclosure requirements is to promote
"economic efficiency by providing participants ... with the information they
need to accommodate their personal financial affairs to the employer's
program, as for example, determining their need for additional savings."4°4
Another important function of the participant disclosure requirements is to
promote employer compliance with ERISA's fiduciary duty requirements and
prohibited transaction rules by "arming" plan participants with information
sufficient to allow them to detect fiduciary misconduct and bring appropriate
civil enforcement actions under ERISA. In enacting ERISA, Congress
recognized that for the disclosure requirements to serve these functions
effectively, the information must "be written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the average plan participant. ,,46
402 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
4' See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect... the
interests of participants in employee benefits plans... by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants
... of financial and other information with respect thereto ...."); id. § 1022 (summary plan description
requirements); id. § 1023 (annual report requirements); id. § 1024 (requirements for filing and furnishing
information to plan participants).
404 Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans," 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 559, 568 &
n.56 (1994).
405 See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4648-49; Wiedenbeck,
supra note 404, at 567-68 and accompanying notes.
4' 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (1994) (summary plan description requirements) (emphasis added).
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Both of these functions remain vital under today's individual responsibility
model. Adequate information is critical to participant decisions concerning
401(k) plan contributions and investments. Adequate information also enables
plan participants to monitor and thus deter abuse of plan assets, such as
excessive fees deducted from the accounts of 401(k) plan participants.4°7 The
disclosure system of the 404(c) Regulations is inconsistent with these functions
because the average plan participant is unlikely to be able to understand or use
the information he receives.
The 404(c) Regulations also are inconsistent with ERISA's participant
disclosure requirements and the fiduciary duty protections for plan
participants. In theory, a participant may choose to have the employer invest
the assets held in his account by refusing to make an affirmative investment
direction. 408 However, the 404(c) Regulations do not require the employer to
reveal and explain this "option" to the participant.4° 9 Thus, the employer is
free to omit this key piece of information when providing the participant with
materials concerning the plan's investment options. The plan participant is left
with the impression that he must choose investments for his plan account,41 °
and unknowingly "waives" the employer's fiduciary responsibilities by making
an affirmative investment direction.41  This result is inconsistent both with the
essential concept of informed independent participant control justifying the, 412
employer's section 404(c) fiduciary liability exemption and with ERISA's
premise that the employer's fiduciary responsibilities under section 404(a)
cannot be waived by the plan participants.
4 1S
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 further erodes ERISA's fiduciary-based statutory
protections for plan participants. An "education" provider is free to steer plan
participants into higher fee-paying mutual funds using "educational" materials.
The education provider's conduct escapes regulation under ERISA because
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 labels the provider a "nonfiduciary." In lieu of
407 The issue of excessive fees charged to participant accounts in 401(k) plans is currently an enforcement
priority for the Department of Labor. See Advisory Council: Labor Department May Issue Consumer Guide
on Section 401(K) Plan Fees, Berg Says, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2123 (Sept. 22, 1997).
4o3 See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
409 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
410 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
411 Investment directions are typically included as part of the materials sed to enroll the participant in the
plan. See supra note 220. Under the 404(c) Regulations, once the participant makes an initial investment
direction, the employer's section 404(c) fiduciary liability exemption is triggered, and the employer thereafter
is no longer responsible for investing those assets. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
412 See supra Part I.C.
413 See sources cited supra note 174.
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ERISA's statutory protections regulating fiduciary conduct, Interpretive
Bulletin 96-1 substitutes a disclaimer.414 Envision this disclaimer, in capital
letters and bold print:
OTHER INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES HAVING SIMILAR
RISK AND RETURN CHARACTERISTICS MAY BE
AVAILABLE UNDER THE PLAN. INFORMATION ON
THESE INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES MAY BE
OBTAINED FROM
Who fills in the "blank" under these circumstances, and more importantly,
their status under ERISA, is not addressed by Interpretive Bulletin 96-1.
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 justifies the non-fiduciary status of the education
provider based on the fiction that the participant is not relying on the
information, but rather is performing an independent assessment. If the
participant attempts to perform an independent assessment, what information is
he likely to receive concerning these "other investment alternatives"? The
likely response will be securities prospectuses in accordance with the 404(c)
Regulations. What happens if, having been provided with this information
concerning other investment alternatives, the inquiring participant requests
assistance in evaluating these "outside" alternatives? Interpretive Bulletin 96-1
does not address this scenario, but the education provider likely will be
reluctant to go beyond providing securities prospectuses for fear of rendering
fiduciary investment advice. Thus, the plan participant likely will be left with
the choice of either ignoring the specific plan investment option identified by
the educational materials, selecting it, or evaluating the additional securities
prospectuses concerning other investment alternatives and reaching an
independent conclusion. Most plan participants likely will rely on the
educational materials and select the identified mutual fund. 4 15
414 See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
415 An alternative solution to this problem would be to prohibit asset allocation models and interactive
investment materials from identifying specific mutual funds available under the plan. This alternative suffers
from the twin flaws of being both unhelpful to participants and easily circumvented by the education provider.
Educational materials that limit their conclusions to generic asset categories would frustrate the plan
participant who, having worked through the educational materials, arrives at a conclusion that his perfect
investment allocation is "60% bond funds/40% equity funds." What the participant really wants to know, of
course, is what specific funds available under his plan satisfy this generic asset allocation? Alternatively, the
specific mutual funds available under the plan could be labeled so as to make a "generic! asset allocation
model in reality a "specific" recommendation of particular investment options. If the conclusion reached by
the participant by using the educational materials is that his account should be invested "60% bond funds/40%
equity funds," and the participant's 404(c) plan offers the minimum 404(c) required number of three
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Interpretive Bulletin 96-i's characterization of the education provider as a
non-fiduciary is inconsistent with the perceptions of plan participants, who are
likely to rely on the materials as investment advice. From the perspective of
the participant there is no distinction between a fiduciary investment advisor
operating under a program similar to the Trust Company of the West program
and a non-fiduciary educational provider operating at the outer margins of
Interpretive Bulletin safe harbor categories 3 and 4.416 This characterization of
the educational provider as a non-fiduciary is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's analysis of fiduciary status in Varity Corp. v. Howe.417 In Varity Corp.
the Court indicated that the perceptions of the average plan participant should
be taken into consideration when making a legal determination of fiduciary
418
status under ERISA.
The Department of Labor could have drawn the "education" versus
"investment advice" line between safe harbors 1 and 2 and safe harbors 3 and
4. Why did it choose not to do so? Under current policy, such an approach
would discourage providing more investment education for plan participants.
Making asset allocation models and interactive investment materials fiduciary
investment advice would trigger more frequent application of the fiduciary
prohibited transaction rules. Rather than directly addressing the real legal
obstacle-the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules-the Department of Labor
gerrymandered around the issues by declaring the service provider's conduct
as "nonfiduciary." The consequence of this short-sighted approach is a
significant erosion of ERISA's statutory protections for plan participants.
V. CONFORMING FEDERAL RETIREMENT POLICY TO THE REALITY OF TODAY'S
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
Today's individual responsibility model presents an administrative
challenge to the Department of Labor. ERISA's statutory scheme, enacted
investment options, the Money Market Fund, the Bond Fund, and the Equity Fund, it becomes obvious that the
materials' "generic" conclusions are actually recommendations of specific plan investment options.
416 See supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
417 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
418 Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 498-505. In Varity Corp., the employer formed two subsidiaries. One
subsidiary was insolvent from the day of its creation, and this insolvency was known to company officers. See
id. at 492-93. Company officers held a series of meetings to induce employees of the newly formed subsidiary
voluntarily to switch their health plan coverage to the plan sponsored by the new subsidiary. At these
meetings company officers made false statements concerning the future viability of the new subsidiary. See id
at 493-94. The Supreme Court held that the company officers were fiduciaries when making these statements,
relying in part on the perceptions of the employees in the context of the meetings. See id. at 503.
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twenty-five years ago, had as its foundation the employer-controlled defined
benefit plan. As participant-directed 401(k) plans have become more pro-
minent, the Department of Labor has responded in an ad hoc fashion, piling
new regulations and interpretation upon this old foundation. A coordinated
and integrated regulatory response, designed specifically for today's partici-
pant-directed 401(k) plan, is needed.
In an ideal world, Congress would modernize ERISA through statutory
amendments. As shown in Part II, such amendments would need to sweep
broadly, reforming the very core of the statute-the definition of a fiduciary,
the duties of a fiduciary, and the transactions prohibited to a fiduciary. To date
Congress has proven unwilling (or simply politically unable) to enact broad
ERISA reforms.4 19 I propose that statutory reforms, although certainly desir-
able, are not necessary. The Department of Labor can remove the legal
obstacles to retirement education and investment advice by modernizing its
own administrative policies interpreting ERISA's statutory provisions.
This Part sets forth a series of coordinated proposals designed to revise
Department of Labor administrative policies in a comprehensive fashion. The
cumulative effect of these proposals is to promote the rendering of
professional, fiduciary retirement planning and investment advice to plan
participants while mitigating the burdens placed on sponsoring employers,
Each of the proposals set forth below is capable of being implemented at the
administrative level without amendment to ERISA's statutory scheme.
A. Proposal: Revise the 404(c) Regulations
Four significant changes are proposed for the 404(c) Regulations. First, the
404(c) Regulations should require participant education at safe harbor levels
1 and 2 for all participant-directed plans. Under Interpretive Bulletin 96-1,
safe harbors levels 1 and 2 allow the employer or service provider to provide
information concerning the plan and general financial and investment
419 Political consensus on ERISA statutory reform appears possible only for narrowly tailored,
uncontroversial amendments that leave undisturbed the underlying core of the statute. See Colleen E. Medill,
HIPAA and its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?
65 TENN. L REV. 485, 507-08 (1998). Congress's legislative actions in 1997 concerning retirement plans
illustrate the point. The SAVER Act, discussed supra Part I.A., is purely a symbolic amendment. The
amendment to ERISA made by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, discussed supra notes 380-81 and
accompanying text, targets a specific issue--employer-directed investment of 401(k) plan monies in employer
stock-that is a relatively rare phenomenon. See supra note 51 (83% of 401(k) plans allow participants to
direct their investments).
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information. Requiring that all participants in 404(c) plans receive this
educational information is more consistent with the disparity in knowledge and
financial sophistication among plan participants. It also is more consistent
with Section 404(c)'s underlying concept of independent participant control.
This requirements ensures that all participants will have access to and may
draw upon a uniform knowledge base to make informed investment decisions.
The proposal would impose few additional administrative burdens on
employers. ERISA already requires employers to provide much of the plan
information covered under safe harbor 1420 The Department of Labor can
minimize the administrative impact of the requirement by developing a list of
required information similar to the list of information required in summary
plan descriptions.421 As in summary plan descriptions, the educational in-
formation should be presented in a manner that is comprehensible to the
average plan participant.422
Second, the 404(c) Regulations should limit to 10% the amount of elective
salary deferral contributions that can be invested by plan participants in
employer stock or real property. A significant percentage of plan participants
overly concentrate their retirement savings in employer stock. Such
concentration of retirement assets in any one investment poses substantial risks
to the participant's retirement income security.
Congress has already recognized the risk that concentrated investments in
employer stock pose to retirement savings. In the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Congress amended ERISA to limit employer-directed investments of
401(k) plan monies in employer stock to 10% of the value of the participant's
401(k) plan account.423 As Professor Stabile has noted, however, this change
is simply not enough.424 Under Proposal A, the 10% limitation would be
extended to participant-directed investments of 401(k) plan assets. Unlike this
recently enacted limitation on employer-directed investments, my proposal
does not require a statutory amendment. It can be implemented as part of the
404(c) Regulations.
420 See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
421 See 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1994). Interpretive Bulletin 96-I's description of safe harbor levels I and 2
materials already form the basis for such a list. See supra Part III.B.1.
422 See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).
423 See supra notes 380-81.
424 See Stabile, supra note 19, at 88.
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Third, the 404(c) Regulations should require employers either to inform
participants expressly of their ability to "opt out" of Section 404(c) by refusing
to make an investment direction; or, in the alternative, to provide fiduciary
investment advice to plan participants. Under this proposal, the 404(c)
Regulations would require the employer to do one of two things. The
employer may disclose to the participant that he has the right to refuse to make
an investment direction, thereby continuing the employer's fiduciary duty to
invest prudently and to diversify the assets held in the participant's 401(k) plan
account. Alternatively, the employer may offer fiduciary investment advice to
the plan participant.
Requiring the employer to disclose this already existing legal right to the
plan participant is more consistent with the spirit of full participant disclosure
that underlies ERISA.425 The countervailing policy consideration is that many
employers who sponsor participant-directed 401(k) plans do so because the
employer's legal responsibilities and administrative compliance costs are less
than under the traditional defined benefit plan.426  Requiring employers to
disclose this "opt out" option to plan participants will impose a burden on the
employer if a significant number of participants choose to let the employer
invest their retirement savings.427 Employers who sponsor another retirement
plan where the employer, or its designated agent, already maintain responsi-
bility for the investment of plan assets are less likely to find this disclosure
requirement burdensome. They are already making plan asset investment
decisions. Employers who are unprepared or unwilling to assume fiduciary
responsibility for making investment decisions may still take advantage of the
second option, providing fiduciary investment advice to plan participants.
The second option provides employers with a strong incentive to provide
professional investment advice to plan participants. Under current Department
of Labor policy, ERISA's fiduciary prohibited transaction rules present
significant legal obstacles to such investment advice.428 As a result, invest-
425 See supra Part IV.C. This disclosure option will become even more important to the extent that
employers adopt "automatic enrollment" 401(k) plans. See supra note 218.
426 See sources cited supra note 24.
427 This proposal raises a question-can the employer combine all of the undirected 401(k) plan monies
and invest them as a pool using one investment strategy for all? Or must the employer take into account each
participant's circumstances and invest the participant's account using an investment strategy tailored to the
individual participant? This issue exists under current law, but the Department of Labor has not addressed it.
My response would be to minimize the burden on the employer by allowing it to invest undirected 40 1(k) plan
monies as a unit rather than on a participant-by-participant basis.
428 See supra Part II.D.
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ment advice for plan participants is difficult for employers to obtain.429
Proposal B below proposes that the Department of Labor address the obstacles
of the prohibited transaction rules directly by developing exemptions designed
for today's individual responsibility models. 43  These administrative exemp-
tions will make investment advice for plan participants less costly and more
readily available.
Fourth, the 404(c) Regulations should be revised to address explicitly the
circumstances under which an employer who offers fiduciary investment
advice to plan participants will qualify for the section 404(c) fiduciary liability
exemption for participant-directed investment losses. The 404(c) Regulations
are ambiguous on this point. This ambiguity must be clarified so that
employers are not deterred from making investment advice available to plan
participants.431 From the perspective of the sponsoring employer, using a third
party to provide professional investment advice to participants raises another
concern-potential co-fiduciary liability. Proposal D below mitigates the
employer's co-fiduciary responsibilities and potential liability concerning the
actions of the investment advisor.
432
B. Proposal: Develop Class Prohibited Transaction Exemptions to Encourage
Investment Advice
Service providers under today's individual responsibility model are
unlikely to be deterred from rendering fiduciary investment advice due to
concerns over fiduciary liability under ERISA. Typical plan service providers
such as banks, securities brokers, insurance companies and mutual fund
companies routinely render investment advice concerning non-ERISA assets
held in IRAs and private express trusts.433  In these non-ERISA contexts,
providing such investment advice creates a fiduciary relationship under the
common law.4 4 From a liability standpoint the risks are much higher for
429 See supra Part IHE.
430 See infra Part V.B.
431 For example, the 404(c) Regulations could designate a safe harbor for the employer preserving its
section 404(c) protection against investment losses based on the employer's duty of care in selecting and
retaining the investment advisor. See sources cited supra note 176.
432 See infra Part V.D.
433 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 177, § 701, at 201-08; SCOTT & FRATCtER, supra note 177,
§ 16A, at 215; Jack Rigney, Mutual Fund Asset Allocation Programs, 27 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIEs REG. 63
(1994).
434 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 177, § 701, at 201-08; see also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
177, § 16A, at 215.
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investment advice regarding the investment of non-ERISA assets because,
unlike assets subject to ERISA, the breach of a common law fiduciary duty
exposes the fiduciary to potential punitive damages.435  Nevertheless, this
greater liability exposure does not deter the rendering of investment advice in
the non-ERISA context.436 Rather, the real obstacle preventing service
providers from rendering fiduciary investment advice to plan participants is
ERISA's fiduciary prohibited transaction rules.
437
The administrative exemptions to the prohibited transaction rules available
to fiduciary investment advisors today are designed for employer-controlled
defined benefit plans, not participant-directed 401(k) plans.43s Proposal B
suggests two revisions to Department of Labor policy. First, the Department
of Labor should create a series of new class exemptions patterned after the
terms and conditions of the individual exemptions granted to Shearson Lehman
and Trust Company of the West. Second, the Department of Labor should
modernize existing class exemptions to reflect the participant-directed plan
and its use of the no-load mutual fund as an investment option. Each of these
revisions is discussed below.
These suggested revisions are consistent with ERISA's statutory criteria for
the issuance of administrative exemptions to the prohibited transaction rules
governing fiduciary conduct.439 The Department of Labor should interpret and
construe the statutory criteria that the exemption must be "in the interests of
the plan and of its participants ' '44 and must be "protective of the rights of
participants' ' 4 broadly and take into account the empirical research indicating
the need for investment advice. Plan participants and plan assets will be
protected from potential abuse 442 by ERISA's section 404(a) fiduciary duties
of loyalty44 and prudence. These fiduciary responsibilities of the investment
435 Compare BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 177, § 862, at 48-61 and SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note
177, § 205, at 238-39 n.2, with Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139-41 (1985) and
AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, supra note 17, at 340-48.
436 See Rigney, supra note 433, at 63.
417 See supra Parts 1.D., E.
438 See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
439 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
4'0 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a)(2) (1994).
44' 29 U.S.C. § I 108(a)(3).
442 See discussion of the "steering problem" supra Part LI.B.3.
443 The federal courts have construed the section 404(a)(1) duty of loyalty as permitting a fiduciary to
receive an "incidental benefit." See Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987); Donovan v.
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982). I view allowing the investment advisor to receive reasonable
mutual fund fees from the plan's investment options as consistent with the incidental benefit doctrine and
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advisor, which are not waived when the Department of Labor 4 rants an
exemption from ERISA's fiduciary prohibited transaction rules, provide
adequate safeguards for plan participants. 445
The first proposed action, the creation of class exemptions patterned after
the Shearson Lehman and Trust Company of the West individual exemptions,
eliminates the legal obstacle of ERISA's fiduciary prohibited transaction rules.
The fixed limitation on participant fees of the Shearson Lehman exemption and
the "neutral" design of the Trust Company of the West computerized
investment advice program protect participants against intentional "steering"
into higher-fee-generating investment options. The plan participants are
protected against excessive fee-taking by the fiduciary investment advisor at
the mutual fund level through another set of federal laws-the federal
securities laws governing mutual fund companies.
446
The second proposed policy change is the modernization of the terms and
conditions of existing class exemptions. The two most significant class pro-
hibited transaction exemptions applicable to mutual fund investments were
issued in 197744 and 1984,448 prior to the emergence of participant-directed
plans and no-load mutual funds. These exemptions should be explicitly
updated to allow the participants, rather than the employer, to receive dis-
closure of and approve the investment advisor's business ties to the plan's
mutual fund investment options.449  The disclosure standard for participants
should again parallel ERISA's disclosure standards for summary plan
descriptions. 45  The disclosures should be written in a manner that is
comprehensible to a plan participant without special expertise in investment or
financial matters, and should take into account the average level of participant
therefore not a violation of the advisor's fiduciary duty of loyalty under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994).
444 See sources cited supra note 240.
445 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a).
446 See supra note 226.
447 See supra note 259 (discussing Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-4).
448 See supra note 259 (discussing Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24).
449 Prohibited Transaction Exemptions 77-4 and 84-24 both contemplate that the employer will act as the
"independent fiduciary" who must receive disclosure of and approve the fiduciary investment advisor's
financial arrangements with the plan's mutual fund investment options. See supra notes 259-60 and
accompanying text. It is unclear under current Department of Labor policy whether a plan can be designed so
that the plan participants themselves will qualify as the approving independent fiduciaries necessary to satisfy
the terms of these class exemptions. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
450 See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
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knowledge of financial investment matters as reflected by the empirical
research.
In addition, the terms and conditions of the Department of Labor's 1977
class exemption, prohibiting the investment advisor from receiving any "sales
commission" from the participant's mutual fund investment,451 should be
revisited in light of the growing popularity of the no-load mutual fund as a plan
investment option. The various fee arrangements that exist today between no-
load mutual funds and plan service providers were not possible under the
federal securities laws in 1977, and thus were not contemplated by or covered
under the terms of the original exemption.452 In updating this 1977 exemption,
the Department of Labor should give strong deference to the comprehensive
regulation of these no-load mutual fund fees by another federal agency, the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
453
C. Proposal: Revise Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 So That Real Investment
Advisors (Safe Harbor Levels 3 and 4) Are Real ERISA Fiduciaries
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 is flawed. It erodes ERISA's statutory pro-
tections for plan participants by making service providers who provide asset
allocation models and materials non-fiduciaries. 454 At the same time, it im-
poses undue burdens on employers. These burdens lie in the employer's duty
to monitor the "educational" materials su plied to plan participants for
compliance with the Bulletin's requirements.
4 T
Proposal C reforms Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 so that it is more consistent
with ERISA's two core legislative objectives. The stated objective of
Interpretive Bulletin 96-1-to encourage employers and service providers to
offer investment education to plan participants-is unaffected by Proposal C.
Such investment education is provided at safe harbor levels 1 and 2.
The flaw in Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 lies in its characterization of service
provider conduct at safe harbor levels 3 and 4-asset allocation models and
interactive investment materials. The presentation of these models and
materials to plan participants varies along a continuum. At one end, the
451 See sources cited supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
452 See Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-4, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,732-34 (1977); see also MEYERS &
RIC-MAN, supra note 259, at 92-100.
453 See supra note 226.
454 See supra Part IV.C.
455 See supra Part IV.B.
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models and materials are likely to be little more than a small step beyond the
educational materials of safe harbors 1 and 2. At the other end of the
continuum, however, the models and materials (and particularly the service
provider's presentation of them) become indistinguishable from the fiduciary
456
rendering of investment advice. Drawing a line somewhere in the middle of
this continuum is impracticable. 457  Interpretive Bulletin 96-1 takes the
approach that is least protective of plan participants, characterizing the entire
range of service provider conduct as non-fiduciary, thereby leaving plan
participants at the far end of the spectrum, unprotected in the event of service
provider misconduct.
458
Proposal C advocates the opposite approach to this difficult character-
ization issue. If service provider conduct at safe harbor levels 3 and 4 is
characterized as fiduciary conduct, the plan participants are better protected
because service provider conduct at all points along the continuum remains
subject to ERISA's fiduciary-based protections for plan participants. 459
Although this approach may be criticized as overly inclusive of fiduciary
conduct toward the educational end of the continuum, such an approach is
more consistent with ERISA's core legislative purpose of protecting plan
participants."
Proposal B, described above, removes the legal obstacles and financial
disincentives to fiduciary investment advice under ERISA's prohibited
transaction rules. The other legal deterrent to fiduciary investment advice for
plan participants-the employer's potential co-fiduciary liability-is addressed
in Proposal D.
D. Proposal: Provide Guidance to Employers Concerning the Duty to
Monitor and Co-Fiduciary Liability for Investment Advisor Conduct
The employer's fiduciary duty under ERISA section 404(a) to monitor the
activities of a co-fiduciary investment advisor imposes a significant adminis-
trative burden.46 1  The parameters of this employer responsibility are un-
456 See supra Part III.B.2.
457 See supra note 415.
458 See supra Part IV.C.
459 See supra Part IIB. The criteria for compliance with safe harbors 3 and 4 are potentially useful in
that they can be viewed as forming the framework outlining the fiduciary responsibilities of an investment
advisor to plan participants.
460 See supra Part IV.C.
461 See supra Part IV.B.
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certain.4 62 Clarification in the form of regulatory guidance is needed to address
and resolve these monitoring issues, with an eye toward mitigating the burden
placed on the employer.
The Department of Labor should allow employers to assert as a defense to
a co-fiduciary liability claim good faith reliance on representations made by a
co-fiduciary investment advisor. The employer's duty to monitor the activities
of a fiduciary investment advisor arises under section 404(a) as part of its duty
of care, and also under section 405 in the form of co-fiduciary liability for the
wrongful conduct of the investment advisor. The parameters of the employer's
duty to monitor and co-fiduciary liability have not been the subject of
regulatory guidance. Under Proposals A and C, the role of service providers
with respect to the individual responsibility model will change so that more
service providers will be engaged in fiduciary conduct as investment advisors
to plan participants. Consequently, the scope of the employer's duty to
monitor and co-fiduciary liability will become more significant, and the need
for regulatory guidance to resolve ambiguities in the statute will become more
critical.
Under Proposal D, the employer can rely in good faith upon the
representations of the investment advisor that its advice is consistent with its
duties as an ERISA fiduciary. This proposal mitigates the potentially onerous
monitoring burden placed on employers by clarifying that, absent actual
knowledge of wrongdoing, the employer is not required as part of its duty of
monitoring to inquire beyond the representations of the investment advisor.
Thus, the employer is not required to discern whether, for example, the
investment advisor's recommendations to individual plan participants are in
accordance with modem portfolio theory. Providing such regulatory guidance
provides assurance to employers and thereby encourages them to provide
fiduciary investment advice to plan participants.
A countervailing policy consideration is that restricting the scope of the
employer's duty of monitoring restricts the protections available to plan
participants. Under Proposal D, if the fiduciary investment advisor breaches
its fiduciary duties in the course of advising plan participants, the employer is
less likely to incur co-fiduciary liability, and thus the participants' legal
recourse under ERISA may be limited to bringing suit against the fiduciary
investment advisor. Consequently, it becomes much more important for the
462 See supra Part P1.B.
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investment advisor to be financially solvent and thus able to restore to the
participant any investment losses or ill-gotten profits resulting from the
advisor's breach of fiduciary duty.463 Proposal E below addresses this concern.
E. Proposal: Establish Financial Solvency Requirements for Fiduciary
Investment Advisors
Proposals A, B, and C above all serve to encourage service providers to
assume the role of fiduciary investment advisors to plan participants under the
individual responsibility model. At the same time, Proposal D limits the scope
of the employer's co-fiduciary monitoring duties and potential liability with
respect to fiduciary investment advisors. Consequently, to ensure adequate
protection to plan participants, the Department of Labor should impose
financial solvency requirements on fiduciary investment advisors so that plan
participants will be able to recoup any investment losses or ill-gotten profits
resulting from an advisor's breach of fiduciary duty.
Service providers generally fall into two categories; those who already
operate in highly regulated industries, such as banks, securities brokerage
firms, insurance companies, or mutual fund companies, and those that do not.
This distinction should be incorporated into Department of Labor policy.
Those service providers who operate in highly regulated industries where
another administrative body sets and monitors solvency requirements should
be made exempt from any additional regulatory solvency requirements under
Department of Labor policy. "Non-regulated" service providers should be
made subject to a bonding requirement based on the amount of plan assets
subject to the investment advice.4'4 In the context of a non-regulated fiduciary
investment advisor, a bonding requirement is desirable because it is easily
verifiable.
This solvency requirement should be implemented in two areas. First, it
should be incorporated into the terms and conditions of the class prohibited
transaction exemptions available to fiduciary investment advisors. Second, it
should be incorporated into regulatory guidance on the employer's duty to
463 See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
464 This proposed bonding requirement would parallel the bonding requirement for plan fiduciaries under
section 412 of ERISA for fraudulent or dishonest acts. 29 U.S.C. § 1363(a) (1994). The bonding requirement
under Proposal E would expand the protections of the section 412 bonding requirement by expanding its scope
to cover negligent conduct and by increasing the amount of the bond, without a maximum limitation, based on
the value of the plan assets subject to the fiduciary's investment advice. Id.
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monitor the co-fiduciary investment advisor.465  Under this regulatory gui-
dance, the employer would be responsible, as part of its duty of monitoring, for
independently verifying that a non-regulated fiduciary investment advisor had
satisfied the bonding requirement. Alternatively, the employer would not be
responsible as part of its duty of monitoring for independently verifying the
financial stability of a fiduciary investment advisor in the regulated industry
category.
F. Response to Potential Criticisms of the Proposals
Under the proposals set forth above, the employer must either obtain
professional investment advice for plan participants or invest the 401(k) assets
of participants who choose not to do so themselves. A potential criticism of
these proposals is that the additional costs to the employer could ultimately
reduce retirement plan coverage, particularly among the cost-sensitive smaller
employers who tend to favor participant-directed 401(k) plans.466 Several
factors mitigate against the likelihood that the proposals will increase plan
administrative costs to the point that retirement plan coverage is significantly
reduced as a result.467 First, the competition among financial services entities
for retirement plan dollars is fierce. This competition, if encouraged by the
Department of Labor, is likely to act as a natural constraint on increased
administrative costs. 469 Second, under the individual responsibility model the
465 See sources cited supra note 176 and accompanying text.
466 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
467 In an ideal policy world, policy makers would know the exact correlation between increasing plan
costs and the willingness of employers to continue to sponsor retirement plans. Despite the abundance of
research among social scientists in this area, no one has yet been able to put forth a comprehensive theory
explaining how plan costs, along with other factors, influence the employer's voluntary decision to sponsor a
retirement plan. Thus policy makers in this area must operate to a certain extent in an informational vacuum.
468 See Caroline Humer, Companies Offer 401(k) Services Online, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1998, at B9;
Mary Romano, Mutual-Fund Groups Now Compete To Offer 401 (K) Plans To Small Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct.
24, 1994, at A7; Romano, supra note 226; Ellen E. Schultz, "Poodle Parlor" Retirement Plans, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 13, 1998, at Cl; Ellen E. Schultz, Schwab Jumps Into Providing 401(k) Plans, WALL ST. J., April 3,
1996, at Cl; Pui-Wing Tam, Retirement Talk in the 401(k) Industry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1998, at Cl;
Williamson, supra note 363, at 1; Christine Williamson, Survival of Alliances Is Questioned: Fund &
Company Competition Hurts, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July 24, 1995, at 22; sources cited supra notes 7,
125.
469 The Department of Labor's 1998 study of 401(k) plan fees concluded that the wide variance in fees
being charged by 401(k) plan service providers indicates that the market for 401(k) plan services is inefficient
due to a lack of easily accessible and comparable fee disclosure information for employers. See PENSION &
WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 31, § IV. The study indicates that enhanced disclosure of fees and
improved access to information concerning the fees charged by various 401(k) plan service providers would
reduce the administrative costs of 401(k) plan sponsorship to employers, particularly smaller employers, by
allowing them to more easily comparison shop for plan services. See id. Part 2.7.4 & § V. The Department of
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employer can pass through most, if not all, of the increased administrative
costs to the plan participants in the form of administrative fees deducted from
participant accounts. 470 Thus, any resulting increased plan costs are likely to
be borne by the parties-the plan participants-who are benefitting from the
enhanced services.
471
Third, many plan service providers already have investment advice
programs in place and routinely offer these services to non-ERISA clients,
such as individuals who are directing the investment of their individual
retirement accounts, or trustees who are responsible for investing the assets of
private express trusts.472 These programs and services are easily transferrable
to the ERISA context, where the service provider will be subject to less, not
more, potential fiduciary liability
4 73
Finally, the requirements of these reform proposals can be phased in over
time, beginning first with large employers, and gradually becoming applicable
to smaller employers. By phasing these requirements in over time, the
likelihood is increased that once the new the requirements apply to the cost-
sensitive smaller employers, the competition among plan service providers for
401(k) plan dollars will have reduced any additional administrative cost
increases to a minimum.
Labor is considering what, if any, additional measures it will take to improve fee disclosures. See DOL Issues
Fee Guide, supra note 339; Labor Department Seeks to Gauge Fees' Role In Section 401(K) Choices, 25 Pen.
& Ben. Rep. (ENA) 2599 (Nov. 9, 1998). The Department of Labor could further encourage price competition
by developing uniform standards for disclosure of service provider fees. It also could maintain as a public
service a database, available online, containing information on fees voluntarily supplied by service providers.
470 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFrrs ADMIN., supra note 31, Part 3.6. The amount of such fee
deductions would, of course, still be subject to the employer's duty to monitor. See id. § I; see also sources
cited supra note 176. There is some evidence that employers have, in fact, already in effect shifted much of
the costs of plan administration to plan participants by selecting mutual funds with higher Rule 12b-I fees in
exchange for free or reduced-cost reeordkeeping by the service provider. See Ellen E. Schultz & Vanessa
O'Connell, Fund Track- A 401(K) Surprise: Fees Keep Going Up and Up, WAL ST. J., Nov. 12,1997, at Cl.
This practice raises potentially grave fiduciary duty issues, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
Article.
471 Deductions from participant accounts can significantly reduce the amount of money available upon
retirement. See Stephen J. Butler, Beware of "Packaged" Retirement Plans, WAML ST. J., Sept. 18, 1995, at
A18. This danger is mitigated by the employer's fiduciary duty to monitor and avoid the deduction of
"excessive" fees from participant accounts. See sources cited supra note 176.
472 See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMIN., supra note 31, Parts 2.6-2.7; Rigney, supra note 433, at
63; Williams, supra note 365.
473 See supra notes 433-36 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of ERISA is to promote and protect retirement income
security for plan participants. Under today's individual responsibility model of
retirement plans, this purpose can best be achieved by providing plan
participants with professional assistance, by accountable fiduciaries, in making
retirement planning and investment decisions. The Department of Labor's
current interpretation of ERISA, originally developed in the context of the
employer-controlled defined benefit plan, is ill-suited to today's participant-
directed 401(k) plan. This Article invites the Department of Labor to interpret
ERISA in a more flexible manner and modernize administrative policy to
conform to the reality of participant decision-making under the individual
responsibility model.
